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Christianity and Society

Tillich's Reconstruction of the Concept of Ideology

Elizabeth P. Lam

Ivory Towers and Battle Turrets


Liston Pope

The Internal Defense of Democracy

Rose Terlin

The British Labour Movement and the War Against Nazi Germany

Arnold Nash



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EDITORIALS

War Aims and a Just Peace

In writing about war aims and deploring the reluctance of the British government to give any indication of its aims, and the necessity of survival, *The New Statesman and Nation*, a British journal, declares: "The United States must now speak to Europe with a commanding voice if she will. The President must make the publication of war aims which America can agree, the necessary condition of full American support." This statement is obviously true, but it is well to face the difficulties which are suggested by *The New Statesman and Nation*. It is true that the British government has not gone far enough in stating its war aims. In this it is partially justified, because it may be too much to ask a fireman, engaged in putting out a dangerous fire, to be an architect also while he is engaged in his immediate work. Great conflicts are never merely conflicts of survival, but they are that in the immediate instance: and one cannot expect men, engaged in a desperate struggle to avoid enslavement, for failing to take the time for the elaboration of a social structure in which both slavery and anarchy will be avoided. Nevertheless, it becomes increasingly important to define and state war aims. It is important because European civilization will sink into complete chaos if

an answer to the problem of international anarchy is not found. We know very well that the German answer of the tyrannical unification of Europe must be resisted at all costs. But this is merely a negative task and does not give us the final answer. Definition of war aims is important, furthermore, because it is probable that the war cannot be won if the British people cannot preserve their now splendid morale by the justified hope that their sacrifices will not have been in vain; if the German people cannot be weaned from their reliance upon Hitler by the assurance that defeat will not mean the destruction and dismemberment of Germany; and if the conquered nations, whose ultimate revolt against the oppressor is a final prerequisite of victory, are not given assurances that the costly adventure of such a revolt will lead to a new order in Europe.

The definition of war aims is important for another reason, related to the problems of these conquered nations. If plans are not made before the day of victory (if any) the smaller nations will be inclined to demand merely the restitution of their separate sovereignties. There is even now too strong an inclination of British statesmanship to promise just that. Such a consummation would be a catastrophe for Europe. It would destroy the one possible gain which has been achieved by Hitler's tentative victories.

His victories have proved that many small nations, each following their own devices, are no match for the striking power of one strong nation, intent upon conquest. The policies which he has followed after his victories have proved that tyranny is no proper alternative to international anarchy. These two facts eliminate two false answers to the international problem but they do not yet give us the right answer. The right answer is certainly not Mr. H. G. Wells' utopian belief that all nations must be eliminated. (There is a curious similarity between Mr. Wells' solution of the international problem and Mr. John Macmurray's solution of the racial problem and Mr. Gerald Heard's solution of the individual problem. Mr. Wells would eliminate nations, Mr. Macmurray would eliminate races and Mr. Heard would prevent the conflict between competing selves by the elimination of selfhood.)

Nations, or social organisms akin to nations, belong to the "given" of the international situation. But if national sovereignty is not abridged and limited, European anarchy will destroy European civilization and this war will have been merely one more milestone in the decay of western Christendom.

Nor are the British students of world affairs, who are concerned with this problem, wrong in believing that America could make a large contribution to the proper determination of this issue. We are no more virtuous than Europe, but we do have a certain detachment which would make it possible to speak. And while we have our own imperialism, we could nevertheless make demands upon Britain, where its imperialism is most dubious and where Churchill's past prejudices are most impeding to a new order. That refers particularly to India and to the reluctance of British imperial-

ists to make a venture of freedom and democracy there.

What hinders us then from using the increasing aid, which we are giving and are bound to give in even larger measure as it becomes increasingly clear that our fate is linked with that of Britain's, as an instrument of pressure upon British policy? Why do we not ask for a quid pro quo? We could ask for almost anything and receive it, particularly if the request dealt with matters of common interests of civilization and not our own interests. We are hindered in various ways. For one thing we are not good enough to make such demands. Some social forces among us, which support the British cause, do so purely from the standpoint of narrow national self-interest and without any concern for the future of civilization. But this is not the primary reason for our hesitancy. The primary reason is that the impulses and traditions of isolationism are so powerful among us and there are so many moralists in America who regard war itself as the absolute evil, that our government will be tempted not to arouse them by any clear-cut policy, which would involve such bargains as have been suggested. We will be tempted rather to drift into further and further stages of non-belligerent aid to Britain without any clear plan or policy with regard to the future. Whether such aid will finally be followed by actual belligerency is a question which no one can answer. It may not be necessary for the defeat of Hitler; and it may not be given, even if necessary. But this is beside the point at present.

The question is whether we will use any aid as an instrument of pressure upon Europe in this important issue. There can hardly be a question but that Roosevelt is fitted by temperament and inclination to play just such a rôle a

New Statesman assigns to him. He have the courage to do it in defiance the tendencies in our public life which tempt him merely to drift. But esmen cannot fashion policies out of ple cloth. If the people who are really erested in a new order of international ice were not beguiled in such large mbers by perfectionist illusions, there ld be a very powerful force of public ion behind such policies as the Brit- liberals suggest to us. Might we not refore suggest to all "idealists" that ore they retreat to the despairing con- tion that nothing good can come out his war, they try to survey once more w some good might come out of it and what means the evil of the present ation might be transmuted into an imate good? Hitler has destroyed the Europe. He must be prevented from ring a new barbarism on its destruc- n. That is the immediate task. It is o a negative task. The ultimate and positive task of achieving a stable ernational order, compatible with the essities of a technical age, conserving true values of nationality and tran- dng the false policies of autonomous ionalism, requires the resources of at is best in life of all modern nations. we could overcome the defeatism of d people, it is a task not incapable of mpishment. It is a problem of at difficulty; but it is different in ree and not in kind from the typical al-political tasks of every period of ory. The task of achieving justice on h is never a matter of realizing a fect brotherhood which would make politics unnecessary. It is always a ter of beguiling chaos into cosmos; using forces which might, if undi- ed, lead to chaos so that they will n a structure of justice upon a higher l.

The War Situation

After the scare of last June, when it seemed for a few moments as if the whole of Europe would fall under the Nazi heel with the collapse of France, the American people have gradually come to the conclusion that Britain must be supported at all costs. The heroic resistance of the British people has given us time to come to our senses, survey the meaning of a possible German victory, organize our production with the purpose of increasing our material support of the British cause and consolidate the will of the nation behind something like a general, though not quite unanimous, purpose.

Though we have moved rapidly, it now appears that we have not moved rapidly enough, either in defining our purpose or in carrying it out. The fact is that Britain is in the gravest peril. We know the stuff of which this nation is made well enough to know that there will be no sudden collapse. However, the ability of the Germans to continue night bombing on city after city and the increasing toll taken by submarine and bomber of the British merchant fleet war-rants anxiety with regard to the future. This anxiety is only slightly offset by the ignominious defeat of the Italians and the consequent improvement in the Mediterranean situation.

It is obvious that we will have to increase our aid measurably, if Britain is to carry the burden of this battle. The government is now prepared to transfer merchant shipping tonnage to Britain and there is talk of repealing the Johnson act and granting a loan. One hopes that the nation will be imaginative enough not to make a loan, but an outright gift of several billions worth of goods. If the majority of the nation, which believes

that our liberties are involved in this battle, are right, such a gift would be a matter of moral decency and of good politics. The experience of the past war has proved that international loans negotiated in war time, under the impetus of war production, cannot be paid in peace time. The creditor nation has the gold and does not want the goods of the debtor nation.

Whether we go beyond the present generally accepted policy of all possible material aid to Britain, and add credits and beyond that shipping, and beyond that not yet devised forms of support and even in the final instance, belligerent aid, is a question which this journal regards as matters of policy and not of principle. The political principle upon which we are agreed is that everything must be done that can be done to insure the defeat of the Nazis. The moral viewpoint which makes such a conviction possible is that enslavement to tyranny is worse than war. The religious presuppositions, which inform these convictions of politics and morals, persuade us that an uneasy conscience about not being in a war may be as justified as the uneasy conscience which men must have who engage in one. When it becomes apparent that one is inextricably related to another nation in warding off a common peril, and when it is obvious that nothing but the defeat of a relentless foe can overcome this peril, must one not have an uneasy conscience about the enjoyment of a security for which other men are suffering untold agonies?

We have heard much about disquieted consciences since this war broke out but nothing about this kind of disquiet. At any rate we confess to this uneasiness and for that reason we regard the degree of involvement in this war as a matter of policy and not of principle. This ques-

tion of policy must be decided by technical considerations. Considering the perils which we face in both east and west, the technical question is how best we may contribute to the cause of the democracies.

Roosevelt's Election

Despite the ambiguities of Rooseveltian liberalism the reelection of the president was a heartening revelation of the ability of democracy to arrive at a right decision in a crisis. For that election meant that the majority of the people understood the perils to democracy both internally and externally. A Willkie election would have meant equivocation in foreign policy and the rule of big business in the defence program. We will not presume to judge how many people voted for Roosevelt's foreign policy while disagreeing with his domestic policy and how many voted for the New Deal though disagreeing with the foreign policy. It is sufficient that enough voted for either one or the other or both to win the election, and that both were equally necessary to make the election meaningful.

A special word might be said about the "wisdom" of a democracy in making such a choice. No election in our history has validated the principle of universal suffrage more than this one. The "good" people and the "wise" people, the intellectually respectable, the "leaders" voted generally for Willkie. He had a majority on most college campuses, though it is only fair to say that the faculties were usually less conservative than the students. During the campaign if one went out to "dine" one always dined with Willkie buttons, while if one merely ate, one ate with Roosevelt sympathizers. (The buttons were frequently absent, for in a democracy the common man who

has the superior political power by reason of his numbers, must beware lest he affront those who have the superior economic power and might make him pay for his vote with his job.)

It was these common people who reached the right decision. This merely proves that the counsels of democracy are not complete if the "disinterested" intelligence of college presidents, "cultured" business men, Christian journalists and prima donna preachers is not balanced by the wisdom which resides in hungry stomachs and anxious hearts. "Blessed are the poor" for many reasons, including this reason—that there is a freedom in their direct experience with the insecurities of life which is withheld from the wise and prudent. Selah!

The Social Struggle and The Roosevelt Victory

A triumph over reaction does not mean a victory for democracy. The Roosevelt victory represents a triumph over the reactionary forces behind Willkie. But the forces behind Roosevelt are many and they are sometimes in contradiction with each other. It is idle to hold Roosevelt himself responsible for equivocations and ambiguities in his policy. The fact that his long power in American politics has depended upon extraordinary skill in holding a political team together which contains such diverse elements as northern bourgeois, western agrarians, CIO and the AFL. Senator Byrd and Senator Norris have little in common. There is even less in common between let us say Senator George and Senator Hillman. There is, in addition, the conflict in the camp of labor itself.

Whether such an administration will continue to advance in the direction of widening the base of democratic rights, economic and political, depends partly

upon the skill of the leader, but to a very large degree also upon the unity and force of the progressive forces in and behind the administration. It is obvious, for instance, that the conservative forces would not have succeeded in getting rid of Chairman Madden of the labor board, if the two labor organizations had not been divided on the question of this board. The effort of reactionaries to use the pressure of defence needs to sabotage the labor act can be resisted only by a united labor movement.

One of the great problems which confronts the administration in securing both adequate defence and adequate labor rights lies in the fact that the aviation industry is at once the keystone of modern defence industry and also the most reactionary in labor policy. It is still unorganized and naturally labor will seek to organize it under the pressure of this emergency. The same industry which held up important defence contracts until it was assured of adequate profits and a very favorable amortization bill, will seek to put labor's challenge to its autocracy in the light of sabotage of the national defence. The proposed bill which would make it a crime to strike in a defence industry is exactly the kind of thing we must expect from the reactionary forces in America.

One difficulty in the past with regard to the social problems of a defence economy has been that labor has taken a negative and sometimes even a hostile attitude toward the necessities of defence. This is reminiscent of British labor opposing the conscription act in Britain only six months before the war when it might have used it on the bargain counter and gained all sorts of concessions for supporting it. As it was the international situation made conscription imperative and labor had to accept it anyway, with-

out gaining anything for its support. There is no possibility of persuading the nation not to take every defence precaution in the kind of world in which we now live. A positive attitude toward defence would enable labor to insist upon preserving and extending its rights within the limits and necessities of a defence economy.

It could legitimately and reasonably demand the following:

a. No diminution of living standards until the entire labor surplus of many millions of unemployed has been absorbed.

b. Taxation schedules which will place as large a burden as possible upon the current budget, thus reducing the inevitably large national deficits and thereby averting the peril of inflation.

c. Resistance to taxation schemes, such as the sales tax, which demand "equality of sacrifice" fraudulently by reducing the consumption power of the masses who can buy only necessities without seriously impairing the luxury standards of the rich.

d. Careful discrimination between legitimate legal action against sabotage, and treason and illegitimate destruction of civil liberties. It must be emphasized that the preservation of civil liberties in a democracy is not inimical to, but a support of, democracy's defensive power. Without the corrective of criticism, government bureaucratic inefficiency becomes oppressive and special privileges by the powerful are enlarged rather than diminished.

e. Resistance to all efforts to identify disloyalty with race and to use the national emergency for restricting the rights of immigrants and refugees, among whom are many of the best vanguard of democracy. If this is not done, the reactionary enemies of democracy will

seek to destroy the real friends of democracy in the name of democracy. They will corrupt the struggle for democracy by their racial theories. In this struggle it is not race, but action and conviction which determine who the friends and enemies of democracy are. There are "birthright" Americans who are fascist at heart and there are German refugees who understand what we are contending against better than Americans.

Lewis and the CIO

The remarkable performance of John L. Lewis at the CIO convention furnishes us with a pretext for some observations upon the relation of character to leadership and democracy. Lewis, after going over to the camp of the enemies of labor in the campaign, had to redeem his promise that he would resign in the event of Roosevelt's election. He carried out his promise with as little grace as possible in a convention which he dominated by his demagogic gifts and by the appointment of his henchmen to important committee posts. He served notice on the convention that, though no longer president, he would continue to be a power to be reckoned with. Fortunately his abdication has permitted a man, who has stood in his shadow for decades, to emerge as a leader in his own right. Phillip Murray is one of the ablest men in the labor movement and one of the most honest.

The rise and fall of Lewis offers some interesting lessons. There were sentimental purists who used to declare when Lewis founded the CIO that no decent person had a right to support him because he was an egotistic, ambitious, demagogic politician. They were wrong because the cause for which Lewis stood transcended the defects of his personality. That cause was the organization of

unskilled workers in our mass production industries, a cause which was a *qua non* in the attainment of social justice in a technical society. There were others who were convinced that Mr. Lewis had been completely reborn and that his somewhat irresponsible and untidy past was completely a thing of the past. They too were wrong. A leopard does not change his spots so easily. The fact that he was fighting for a good cause, frequently with great skill, does not change his character.

There were those who were not unduly mindful of Mr. Lewis' personal defects and who insisted that egotism and ambition are the inevitable concomitants of men with powerful personalities and that egotism is a necessary part of their equipment. They were also wrong. It is quite true that we are all egotists in one way or other and that the egotism of the powerful is more obvious, either because power aggravates it or makes it more apparent. But it is not right to accept this sinfulness as inevitable or as an instrument of success. The degree to which it is certainly not inevitable. Mr. Murray, who may prove himself a more successful leader than his former chief, is a remarkably self-effacing person and not a very successful leader. And the success which Mr. Lewis had was the result of his abilities and not of his vices. As a matter of fact, his egotism might have wrecked the movement which he founded, if men such as Hillman and Murray had not known how to subordinate precisely such personal considerations as Mr. Lewis never could subordinate.

It is not yet apparent whether the elimination of Mr. Lewis will hasten the unity of labor. The real fact is that though his vanity and will-to-power did retard the efforts toward peace between

the two warring camps, there always were, and still are, issues of principle as well as personal animosities at stake in this struggle. It is a struggle between the aristocrats of industrial labor, the skilled workers, and the real proletariat of industrial labor, the unskilled. The fact that economic interest may divide labor as well as unite it against its foes, is one of those tragic aspects of social history which a too simple view of the class struggle has never taken into consideration. It was this division which helped Hitler come to power in Germany, which contributed to the downfall of France and which may, if not overcome, lead to the triumph of reaction in our own country.

Feeding the Oppressed Nations

No problem related to the war is so agitating the religious community as that concerned with the plan of feeding the conquered nations. Mr. Hoover has enlisted large sections of church opinion for his plan, which proposes to use the funds of exiled governments for the purpose of purchasing our grain surplus for the feeding of the undernourished people of the occupied territories.

It has been suggested that the religious leaders who have opposed the Hoover plan are in error in declaring in the name of religion that this ought not to be done; and that they ought to have restricted themselves to the refutation of the thesis of those who believe that our Christian faith demands the support of Hoover's enterprise. We cannot agree with this suggestion any more than we are willing to refute those who declare that pacifism is the only possible expression of the Christian faith by the mere assertion that there are other possible political strategies compatible with the

Christian faith, without stating which strategy we ourselves adopt.

This problem of feeding conquered peoples and thereby running the danger of giving aid to the conqueror, by relieving him of responsibilities and increasing his own food supply, is merely one of many of the tragic dilemmas with which war faces us. We must be willing to confess that the dilemma is a tragic one; and that we cannot withhold food from hungry people without covering ourselves with guilt.

On the other hand if we believe that no policy which involves the loss of life is justified in any event, we ought also to draw the conclusion that we would rather see the war stopped on any terms than to have more women and children killed in the bombing of British cities. The pacifists, of course, take this position. Those of us who believe that the defeat of the Nazis is a negative sine qua non of a new Europe cannot gag at the final logic of our position with regard to the food problem. We must refuse that food, terrible as are the consequences.

Incidentally, it is important that some minimal method of helping the undernourished be found, which does not run the risk of helping the Nazis. Perhaps it will be possible to send milk for the children and large quantities of medicinal oils. We are glad to hear that such proposals are being favourably considered.

It may be added that evidence multiplies that Mr. Hoover is in contact with the most active appeasement groups in the country, the Lindberghs, Castles, etc. This is evidence of how little his judgment can be trusted in this matter. One item on his program is alone sufficient to invalidate the whole. He declares that he would not ship food if the Germans did not first of all promise to return the

food they have taken. If the Germans did that there would be no need of shipping food into the conquered territories. The Germans can quite obviously not return food which they have been consuming for months past. To present them with this condition would merely give them a chance to make a bogus promise which they could not and did not intend to fulfill.

Editorial Notes

Duff Cooper, the minister of information in the British cabinet, has discovered that the Germans have been abnormal since the beginning of history. He announced this discovery to counteract an address by Sir Neville Henderson, the former ambassador to Berlin, who declared that a way would have to be found to live with the Germans in a fruitful peace. Politics does make strange bedfellows. Who would have thought that one could be thrown into the same political bed with Henderson, the pathetic ambassador who spent years in Berlin without discovering how bad the Nazis are. Duff Cooper knew how bad the Nazis are, but also imagines that the Germans as such are as bad as the Nazis. Henderson didn't think the Nazis were too bad and therefore is also able to defend the Germans. Thus truth and error are compounded and half truth is set against half truth. Meanwhile it is true of course that if the Germans had had as much political wisdom as they have specialized intelligence, they would not have let the Nazis come to power. In that sense the Germans are responsible for the Nazis. But one must not forget that millions of Germans are as much the victims of this fury as the other nations of Europe and that many of them understood the meaning

Hitler long before those who now re-
him understood it.

The strike in the Vultee aviation
works, now settled, presents the labor
problems which will continually confront us
in the next years in a vivid form. The
aviation industry is unorganized and
un-unionized. The CIO quite properly
wishes to extend unionization to this in-
dustry and uses the very pressure of de-
fense necessities as a force on its side.
The industry on the other hand tries to
present labor as disloyal and communistic,
and tries, through strikes, to break the
oligarchy of industry. Attorney-General
Clegg may be right when he declares
that the leadership of the Vultee strike
is in communist hands. The leadership
is certainly left-wing. But it is not
probable that communist foreign policy
determined the strategy of this particular
strike, though there is always a possi-
bility that communists may use the strike
to embarrass defense industries.
In this case the strike was merely part of
a legitimate effort to extend unionization
in a very reactionary industry. The fact
that the aircraft industry, upon which
the main burden of preparedness now
rests, should be so reactionary, will con-
front the nation with constant problems
during the next months and years. It is
therefore important for progressive and
ethical Christians to be on their guard
against interpretations of labor troubles
in this industry which throw the onus of
the difficulties upon "disloyal" labor.

The recent skirmish between the Vati-
can and the Italian fascists is a lesson
in the perils of vagueness. The Vatican
published a touching sermonic plea from
the Pope in favor of a "more just and
harmonious internal order." It was ob-
viously intended as a rebuke to the totali-

tarians, but it was also obviously couched
in terms sufficiently vague to be available
for use and inspiration on both sides of
this tragic struggle.

Immediately the fascist propaganda
chief announced that the Pope had de-
scribed the moral qualities of the "new
order" which the fascist nations intended
to establish in the world. It was precisely
this higher justice which they were seek-
ing. To this interpretation the Pope
offered a mild demurrer. He was speak-
ing, he said, of a justice based upon
brotherhood and upon the Golden Rule.
He was speaking of an international
order based upon the law of love. Such
an international order is of course almost
as remote from the precarious and tenta-
tive harmonies of "democratic" justice,
as from the injustice and tyranny of
totalitarianism. Yet that fact must not
obscure the genuine differences between
democratic justice, however imperfect,
and the fascist negation of justice.

The Pope's perfectionist definitions of
international justice are strikingly simi-
lar to those which are offered in our lib-
eral pulpits every Sunday. Both are so
far removed from the realities of politics
that fascists are almost as plausible as
democrats in appropriating the prestige
of such definitions for their particular
political realities. When one speaks
about justice it is well to be specific and
precise and to sketch in enough detail
to avoid misunderstanding. Everyone
believes in justice and brotherhood in
the abstract. The real question always
is just what kind of justice do you
believe in?

The real source of the ambiguity of
papal diplomacy in regard to the present
international struggle arises from the fact
it has two reasons for supporting fascism
and one reason for rejecting it. The first
reason for supporting it is that all its

traditions prompt it to support the principle of authoritarianism against the principle of democracy. Its own ecclesiastical organization is authoritarian. The second reason is that it has an absolute criterion for measuring the virtue and vice of political systems. That criterion is, what effect does the political system have upon the temporal power and prestige of the church? A totalitarian political system which gives the church some place and prestige, which promises not to destroy it, is a good system. A democratic system, no matter how great its achievements of justice, is evil if it is informed by secular philosophies and seeks even to limit the official position of the church. A communist system is completely evil because it openly avows its intention to destroy the church, whereas fascism usually threatens only to corrupt and enslave the church.

The one reason for opposing totalitarianism from the standpoint of Catholicism is the fact that some totalitarianism,

particularly the German variety, is frankly pagan and avowedly anti-Christian. This pagan element has insinuated itself even into the totalitarianism of the "Latin bloc." The Spanish Phalanx and Senor Sener are symbols of it in Spain. But this corruption inside the "Latin bloc" has not completely destroyed the hope of the church that it can preserve a Catholic form of fascism among the so-called Latin nations. The revival of Catholicism in France under Petain has slightly offset the disappointment over the manifestations of paganism in Spain.

The church can never speak a completely unequivocal word against fascism as such, because it cannot give up the hope that it will be able to contrive some kind of Catholic fascism in the Latin countries in the event of a fascist victory; and that such a consummation will not only save the church from extinction but will actually enhance its prestige and restore something of its medieval glory.

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TILlich'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

By Elizabeth P. Lam

I

In the history of ideas Marx's concept, "ideology," will undoubtedly be given a place of high significance. As an instrument for sociological analysis, it has yielded far-reaching results. From the policeman in the street who scrutinizes political candidates in terms of their economic interests to the philosopher who grapples with the problem of knowledge, we see evidences of the rapid acceptance of Marx's insight. The uses to which the concept has been put have been largely extensive. It has been used to unveil unconscious motives of economic self-interest in the platforms or creeds of political opponents. It has been refined and used by social critics to throw a sickly caste of prejudice and bias upon all social sciences and philosophies. It has condemned Christianity as an illusion and an opiate. And in recent years, it has even undermined faith in the objectivity of truth itself. The concept has played an effective part in making this an age of intellectual skepticism and sophistication. The novelty of "debunking" has worn

What was originally a weapon of the opponents has been turned to our own destruction. We know not where to turn for guidance in arriving at a true picture of our social world. We do not know whose knowledge can be trusted, nor where to be unconscious bias in all statements of "fact." The need to turn Marx's concept to constructive purposes has become for us of primary concern.

Paul Tillich's treatment of this prob-

lem picks up where Marx left off and pushes far beyond the boundaries of Marx's thought. Marx never presented in any systematic fashion his theory of ideology. Scattered references to it appear in his various writings, and from these it is possible to piece together Marx's insight. Tillich, in contrast, has given the theory a unity and philosophical setting which makes it possible for us not only to understand more fully the concept in its negative form, but to move on to positive implications which Marx never developed. Tillich, consequently, has given to the problem a clarity and a perspective which makes its consideration inescapable.

Tillich points out that Marx's approach to knowledge was revolutionary. Previous to Marx, he explains, knowledge had been looked upon as absolute and timeless, being above and beyond the exigencies of history. Whether knowledge be sought by revelation, experimentation, or logical process, it was set apart as qualitatively different from other discoveries of the human mind. It was viewed as super-historical, timeless, and static.¹ Marx brought knowledge within history. He made it a function of particular socio-historical situations. To Tillich this is of the highest significance because it binds knowledge to history and makes its content dynamic, changing, and creative. Knowledge, therefore, takes on a double significance. It is to

¹ *The Interpretation of History* (New York: Scribner's, 1936), pp. 62ff.

be examined not only in terms of what it purports to communicate, but also in terms of what it unconsciously conceals. This approach is analogous to the methodology of modern Biblical scholarship. The text, studied from the viewpoint of lower criticism, aims to find out what the author actually wrote. Subjected to the methods of higher or historical criticism, the text is studied to discover what it unintentionally reveals about the author and his relation to his historical environment.

Tillich goes on to explain that Marx's scrutiny of knowledge from the viewpoint of its social context led to the discovery of unconscious deceptions and illusions in systems of thought. It is this characteristic which gives to knowledge its "ideological" character. The world of social phenomena becomes deflected as it passes from the medium of actual historical events to the symbolic forms of thought. This refraction conceals the true nature of social relationships.² These are characterized by class conflict and exploitation. In order to protect themselves from the "existential menace" of their own estrangement from one another, the dominant political and economic classes have spun philosophies, political economies, and religions expounding justice, mutuality, and equality. The ideological character of knowledge consists of the unconscious bias or illusions which cover up these difficult and unpleasant facts. As an illustration of the way in which ideas camouflage social contradictions, Tillich points to the bourgeois ideals of the eighteenth century slogans and philosophies of equality and fraternity which claimed to include the interests of all individuals and classes in

contrast to the class interests of feudalism.³ But such claims, we know, completely conceal the estrangement of the bourgeoisie from the Fourth Estate. Ideology was used by Marx to explain the blind spots of the dominant class, the lack of "scientific" accuracy in so-called scientific knowledge, and the passive acceptance of social contradictions by the exploited class.

Tillich maintains that we must accept the negative implications of Marx's insight. We must unveil the illusions and deceits of knowledge; we must show clearly that knowledge is rooted in history and mirrors in illusory form the contradictions of man's social environment. This process is painful, especially to those to whom under certain circumstances the unveiling would mean annihilation. "Man defends himself against the unveiling of his actual existence as long as he can; for when he sees himself without the ideologies that surround his existence, on which, as with Oedipus, his self-consciousness rests, he collapses."⁴ This process is negative and disillusioning. It, however, is fundamental if we are to arrive at a true description of social realities. The more acutely, accordingly, one becomes aware of the social contradictions of the existing social order and the inescapable limitations which these impose upon man in his search for truth, the more objective and therefore the more valid will his knowledge become.

This pushes us on to the positive implications of Marx's doctrine. Is unideological knowledge possible? Tillich points out that Marx did not subject his own thought to the charge of ideology.

² "The Religious Symbol," *Journal of Liberal Religion*, II, 16. Cf. also, *Interpretation of History*, pp. 54ff.

³ *Sozialistische Entscheidung* (Potsdam: Alfred Protte Verlag, 1932), p. 100. See also Marx, *Ideologie Allemande* (Paris: Alfred Costes, 1937), p. 195.

⁴ *The Interpretation of History*, p. 65.

comparison of Marx's positive prerequisites for the discovery of truth with that of Kierkegaard is illuminating. Kierkegaard claimed that truth could be covered by those who do not disregard their own inner contradictions; Marx asserted that truth would be disclosed to those who are most acutely aware of their social situation—its class conflict and the alienation of man from man. Those far from the realization of social contradictions is inevitable are the proletariat.⁵ They stand on the border of culture, exposed by the conditions of their very existence to the tensions and human arrangement. Having nothing to cover but their chains, they have no motive to conceal social realities. Furthermore, they cannot escape the concrete historical demands for a new social order. Their decision to devote themselves to the reconstruction of social relationships and to bring in the classless society is itself the doorway to further knowledge. Thus arises the peculiar idea, though intelligible from a Christian viewpoint,⁶ that the greatest possibility of obtaining un-ideological truth is given at the point of greatest meaninglessness, of despair, of the broadest self-alienation of man essence."⁷ This introduces new conditions for the perception of truth, ideological prerequisites, and as such constitutes the positive contribution of Marx to the problem of knowledge. Tillich redefines Marx's definition of proletariat. He distinguishes between "actual" proletariat and the "typical" proletariat. The former is subject to the irrational behavior of mass psychology and does not necessarily meet the conditions for the discovery of truth. The

latter is composed frequently of those individuals who have broken through class lines and have consciously identified themselves with the proletariat cause.⁸ Being more conscious of social tensions because of their border position between classes, they are better able to get at the truth of social relationships.

Are we therefore to conclude that the proletariat, actual or typical, is able to arrive at knowledge free from social bias? Tillich here departs from Marx who did not subject his own thought to the analysis of ideology. All knowledge is ambiguous because every assertion of "fact" touches the interests of some group or individual. No knowledge can claim unconditioned validity.⁹

II

Tillich supports these criticisms by a philosophical frame of reference which pushes Marx's doctrine into cosmic categories. Marx was right, Tillich holds, in connecting the perception of truth with awareness of contradictions. These contradictions, although they take the form of class conflict, do not originate in the social structure, as Marx affirmed. They root back to the demonic, that stratum of reality which surges into human life, individual as well as social, with destructive-creative vitality and strength. It is the source of all tension, for out of it erupt vital energy and force which hold possibilities for good or evil, creativity or destruction. It is this which ultimately accounts for man's lust for power and his estrangement from his fellow men. It also places in a cosmic setting man's inner tensions. The mood of fear and despair is man's unconscious protest against his own ill uses of the demonic. Consequently, men will forever have to

sozialistische Entscheidung, p. 153f.

For further discussion of this, see *Protestantisches und Proletarische Situation* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1930), pp. 16ff.

Interpretation of History, p. 64.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-72.

guard against the ideological tendency of their own nature to veil these existential contradictions. This obviously departs from Marx's view.

This leads to Tillich's restatement of Marx's second prerequisite for intellectual insight. Pushed beyond the space-time dimension of history to depths of cosmic tension, the individual stands before the eternal. It is at this point that he is lifted beyond the demands of a particular, concrete historical situation to the divine imperative—the demands of the Unconditioned. In contrast to Marx who formulated the decision in terms of participation in the class struggle for the elimination of classes, Tillich recognizes the ambiguities which are universal and cosmic. The demands of the situation of today are for something more than socialism, although they include socialism. The ultimate demand upon men is the decision for the Unconditioned, which is commitment to that which transcends the limitations of all human situations.

It is important to observe that at this point Tillich has moved from the problem of the sociology of knowledge to religion. He states that knowledge is accessible "only when one approaches things with the question of the decision of life itself and with the expectation that they will contribute to this end. . . . Exploration passes over into devotion: it takes on religious qualities without being allowed to lose its technical form."

Decision thus defined rests upon the assumption that the individual is free to make such a choice, that is, that he can be sufficiently detached from his own subjectivity and the particular social situation in which he lives. The dialectic opposite of freedom is the compulsiveness of the particular historical forces

which he has to confront. The ambiguity in which man stands is due to the tension between these polar extremes: freedom and historical compulsiveness which Tillich calls fate. All knowledge is born of tension, and consequently must be continually subjected to scrutiny.

This raises the final question as to whether this description of knowledge be itself ideological. This is a question which Marx never raised, but is one with which Tillich grapples. If all knowledge be relative to historical situations, can there be any knowledge which is not ambiguous? Tillich answers: "What is true, however, of all knowledge cannot be true of the knowledge of knowledge, otherwise it would cease to have universal significance. . . . The judgment that is removed from ambiguity . . . can be only the fundamental judgment about the relationship of the Unconditioned and conditioned."¹⁰ This is the guardian position which prevents any individual or group from identifying any human conception of truth with truth itself. It is a judgment which affirms that truth is more than man can understand or conceive. To deny this judgment is to profane the holy and to claim wisdom which is more than human.

In summary, Tillich would judge the validity of knowledge by its connection with the historical realities of a particular social situation (that is, fate); by its relation to the ultimate decisions of men (that is, freedom and Kairos); and by its attitude toward the Unconditioned which guards all knowledge from arrogant pretensions. The absoluteness of knowledge consists in the fact that one is confronted at a moment of time with the "absolute decision for or against truth"; its relativity consists in its essen-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

connectedness with the changes of concrete circumstances.¹¹

We can now see to what a profound extent Tillich has unified and deepened the Marxist concept of ideology. Not only has he given Marx's concept a clarity which it did not originally have, but he has developed from it constructive methods for the discovery of knowledge. Perhaps Marx failed to see the positive im-

ibid., p. 175.

plications of his doctrine because he never clearly stated the relation of the individual to group processes. Tillich has pointed out with penetrating astuteness that whatever is creative in action or in thought is born of individual experience. At the same time he has so related this age-old insight to Marx's sociological conditions for the discovery of truth that we have in Tillich's thought a new synthesis.

A PRAYER

O God, the sovereign of nations and the judge of men, look with compassion upon this sad world so full of misery and sorrow. Enlighten our eyes that we may see the justice of Thy judgments. Increase our faith that we may discern the greatness of Thy mercy. Save us from the sorrow of the world which worketh death and despair. Fill us with a godly sorrow which worketh repentance and carefulness and indignation against evil and desire to do Thy will. So teach us how we may contrive a new order of justice and peace for the nations. Reveal Thy will to us and show us what we ought to do. Show us also what the limits of our powers are and what we cannot do. So may our resolution to do Thy will be supported by our faith in Thee who art able to make the wrath of man to praise Thee and to overrule what men do in defiance of Thy will. Let Thy light so shine in our darkness that our perplexity may not be unto despair. Recall us to our dignity as co-workers together with Thee. Remind us of our weakness that we may look to Thee who worketh in us both to will and to do Thy good pleasure and suppliest what is needed beyond our powers, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

IVORY TOWERS AND BATTLE TURRETS

By Liston Pope

I

A dream of peace appeared in early sources of Western culture, in prophetic visions of every man living at peace under his own vine and fig tree, with swords beaten into plowshares and spears into pruninghooks, and nations learning war no more. In the form in which it reached the Twentieth Century, however, the dream was more nearly a projection of Eighteenth Century theories of progress and Nineteenth Century doctrines of social evolution than a survival of ancient Hebrew-Christian tradition. Pre-eminent social philosophers of the last century—Comte, Marx, Herbert Spencer—differed on many things, but agreed, with few exceptions, that war soon would be replaced by attention to economic activities. For evidence, it was necessary only to look about: the Nineteenth Century was strikingly free of war as compared with the thousand years that had preceded it. The Industrial Revolution held the center of the stage of social evolution; economic and national interests largely coincided with international peace. Napoleon had been overthrown at the beginning of the century, and it seemed that Victoria would rule England forever and Britannia would rule the waves, in peace and trade. If occasional wars appeared, they could easily be interpreted as indications that society was still a little early in the evolutionary process. In due time, war would go the way of man's vestigial tail, or, at worst, would be removed from the body politic through measures no more strenuous

than those required for the excision of a vermiform appendix.

The Twentieth Century fell heir to this dream. Confronted with the first World War, it interpreted war itself as a way to peace, as a way to end all war. Until very recently, large sections of Western thought have continued to believe that all weapons would at last be turned into skyscrapers and gadgets. Nations would "outlaw war," substitute conference for conflagration, rub shoulders instead of cannon, sign peace pacts rather than armament contracts. Amateur statisticians calculated the number of school buildings, churches, city halls, and insane asylums possible of erection with money formerly spent in war. Many pretentious theories, professing scientific status, were formulated to support the wishful prognosis. Disillusionment over the results of the first World War gave wings to anti-war movements. Crusading pacifist publicists captured a large percentage of student opinion, arrogating to their gospel both "the verdict of history" and "the spirit of Christ." Pacifist sentiment spread through the repentant churches; war was "renounced" as "politically futile," "ethically indefensible," and "utterly contradictory to the spirit and ideals of Christianity."

Then came the awakening, and the shattering of the dream of peace in our time. To be sure, a new crop of wistful schemes, claiming to be real alternatives to the contemporary chaos, has appeared. Some of them have attracted widespread attention, thereby attesting to the des-

ate plight of recent thought about
ce. But there must be many people
o are seeking a firmer foundation for
r attitudes, and demanding that their
es shall be moulded in terms of his-
cal possibilities, rather than simply
terms of ancient dreams and ethical
als. Perhaps a few are wondering if
social sciences have anything to con-
bute.

II

It is not assumed that the social sciences
e suddenly been accepted extensively
arbiters of social views. Obviously
e is little disposition at the moment
examine the question of war ration-
or factually. In contentious days,
n determined blocs bending every ef-
to "keep America out of war" or to
nd all possible aid to Britain" or to
any number of other things—in such
s, the mood for dispassionate social
lysis is largely dissipated and almost
versally despised. He that is not for
blatantly, vociferously, passionately
us—is certainly against us, and must
exposed as a victim of illusion, a kins-
n of the ostrich, a mental casualty of
war, or just a plain fool. The world
n fire, heat prevails over light, and
must choose his side for better or
se. An ivory tower is no match for
attle turret. Knowledge for what?
later than you think. Men must act.
us then be up and doing—who cares
ut learning to labor and to wait!
n short, the objective temper is inter-
ed as a deluded attempt to be neu-
in a situation in which nobody can
really neutral. As Machiavelli ob-
ed, "he that remains neutral is bound
e hated by those who lose, and de-
ed by those who win; and, as one
comes to be held of little account, as
seless friend and not a formidable

enemy, he may expect to receive every
kind of offense, and all manner of de-
struction to be planned against him.
. . . "

To be sure, it is hoped that the chem-
ists and engineers employed in the prose-
cution of war will be restrained to some
degree by canons of scientific caution in
venturing judgments, and that their skill
in analysis will not be overwhelmed by
desire for immediate action. Weapons
of destruction are not to be tested by men
whose chief qualification lies in hatred
of Hitler or the British Empire. Even
the officers of combat forces are re-
strained, in so far as there is a military
science, by cool appraisal of the military
problems involved in an action.

Similar restraint is singularly lacking
among most of the politicians, publicists,
ministers, and editors who seek to inform
the public of the sources and issues of the
present war, and of the probable out-
come of various lines of action. Reasons
are most often adduced to support a pro-
gram, rather than being reached through
careful analysis; commitment precedes
comprehension. One dislikes to condemn
by a comparison which prejudices the
case, but it may be in order to point out
that Nazi policy has followed much the
same course. Shortly before Munich,
Goering is reported to have said: "We
believe in reason, but if the world de-
mands otherwise, we shall follow our
Leader." Those in America who hate
Nazism frequently subscribe, in pro-
cedure if not in theory, to a similar
course.

It is generally assumed that the social
sciences have found no results adequately
validated for guidance in the complexi-
ties of the contemporary scene. They
have studied pre-literates, but literacy is
used now as one of the most effective
instruments for the enslavement of man.

They have prattled of social evolution, but it is increasingly clear that the Old Adam will not be selected out of existence in favor of the New Man. They have failed to come to agreement, and when agreement has been reached, the results are said to be inconsequential and largely irrelevant to the fateful decisions necessary in this hour. In brief, disinterested analysis is suspected of having led nowhere in the study of war, except possibly to the illusion that disinterested analysis might at length lead somewhere. But there is no time now for painstaking investigation; even if one cannot know, he must choose, and quickly.

This whole mood—it is a mood, not an analysis—underestimates the positive results achieved in certain branches of social study. It also assumes that dispassionate investigation leads to neutral results. The estimate and the assumption are both in error. For evidence, we turn to examination of the general results reached by social scientists in their study of the relation of war to Western history.

III

Of the innumerable books about war which have appeared in the last twenty years, probably less than a dozen are of any real significance in affording a clearer understanding of their subject.¹ Most of the books have wrestled with ethical alternatives, public attitudes, the nature of man, and similar imponderables, with a sprinkling of carefully selected historical “facts” to buttress preconceived “positions.” They have hastened to justify or condemn. Tracts preaching the gospel of pacifism and pamphlets calling men to be “realistic” in terms of “political relativities” have vied with each other

in creating confusion. Less objective study has been devoted to the configuration of war in Western history than to most minor social questions. There may be more rejoicing in the future over one dispassionate student who discovers cultural dynamics and patterns of war than over ninety and nine who consider it their ethical responsibility to preach either war or peace.

From the studies made thus far, certain conclusions appear to be pretty well validated, though they must be held with the modesty and tentativeness attending all findings of social science. By far the most comprehensive and exact study of war in Western history is that of Pitirim Sorokin, which summarizes the best work previously done and carries the investigation considerably farther.² Many of the following conclusions represent deductions from evidence accumulated by Professor Sorokin, but he is not to be held responsible for the form in which they are presented here, nor for the whole range of statements offered.

First of all, the inability of social science to isolate precisely the “causes” of war is in itself significant for present programs of action. All the simple explanations of war in terms of one or two underlying factors have been shown to be inadequate and misleading. No one of the following factors invariably leads to war: national interests (an expression which raises more questions than it solves), economic advantage, imperialism, nationalism, the pressure of populations, culture conceit, autocratic power, a rearmament race, favoritism as between

¹ For a list that includes most of these, see the bibliography appended to the article, “War,” in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

² Pitirim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York, [1937]), Vol. III, Part Two. Professor Sorokin studied, comparatively and quantitatively (for selected indices), almost all the known wars (a total of 967) of eleven major European nations, from the beginning of the historical period up to 1925.

gerents, racial antipathies, hatred between nations, etc. Even the sweeping theological theory that conflict is a permanent and inevitable mode of human relations because man is inherently and irremediably a sinner, valuable as it may be as an antidote to equally expansive theories of humanism and utopianism, contributes little to a positive explanation of war. This latter theory may be criticized in indication of the sort of distinction possible on any of the alleged causes of war. Are the relatively pacific peoples less sinful than the relatively militant British or Japanese? Are the Spanish people recipients of the act of grace whereby they became less sinful, and therefore less warlike, in the Nineteenth Century than in the Sixteenth? In character, this theological theory is not dissimilar to theories of an "instinct of pugnacity" or a "warlike instinct." It has been universalized, but is of no greater help in explaining the variations of war.

Social science can go no farther at the present than to assert that any war results from a highly complex conjunction of factors, no one of which is in itself invariably a cause of war. Little work has been done thus far on typical combinations leading to war. But this tentative conclusion throws considerable doubt on the efficacy of many contemporary programs designed to avert war. In combination with certain factors, for instance, a strong pacifist movement may lead toward war rather than peace, and it is doubtful that moral solace is derived from "clinging to one's ideals" when steadfastness accelerates the denial of those ideals. Munich represented a modern version of the ancient lament of the Psalmist: "I am for peace, but when they attack they are for war."

This is pretty well established, further,

that peace has not increased as Western culture has developed, and that the hope for permanent peace has little historical evidence to support it. The faith of the Nineteenth Century to this effect has not only failed of evidence; it has been largely discountenanced. Professor Sorokin's studies reveal no clear, continuous trends whatever in the incidence of war in the West, in terms of several indices, from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries, except an increasing ratio of military casualties. The Nineteenth Century was the most peaceful of the eight; thus far, the Twentieth has been by far the most belligerent, and bids fair to be the bloodiest in history.

Nor has war been "abnormal" in Western history, in respect to time spent in its pursuit. On an average, war has appeared in about 50 per cent of the years comprising the history of European nations. Indices of duration are difficult to define, of course, and probably more time was spent in actual fighting in the first World War than in the Hundred Years' War.

Also untenable, in terms of past history, is the notion that peace is prerequisite for growth in culture and wealth, whereas war and national decline proceed together. More often than not, the periods of cultural proliferation in the life of nations have been the most warlike. It is not to be concluded that war causes development in culture; war and cultural unfolding are both probably symptoms of deeper developments about which little is known. It may be that they who take the sword shall perish by the sword, but they have not commonly perished while they had it. The argument that greater wealth and culture would have come without war is obscurantist: one can never prove anything about something that has not occurred.

Within a society, war ordinarily speeds up processes of cultural variation and social mobility, so accelerating social change that extreme "fads" in ideas and manners are likely to be common. The "climate of opinion" changes rapidly; new writers and thinkers replace pre-war favorites quickly outmoded. Wealth tends to be redistributed, more often than not in the direction of the relative impoverishment of the masses. Enormous waste of wealth occurs on the one hand, through destruction by military power and by diversion into destructive rather than productive instruments, but this loss has generally been restored with amazing and unexplained rapidity. On the other hand, war stimulates economic efficiency and invention, and arts devised under pressure of military need are frequently applied and developed still farther in time of peace. Social controls tend to tighten, but particular mass movements may flourish if they contribute to social efficiency. For example, the labor movement in the United States reached new peaks of membership and power during the first World War, and may do so again in the contemporary defense program in so far as collective bargaining promotes industrial efficiency. War leads toward centralization of governmental authority for its duration, but frequently contributes to revolution and reform at its close, especially if the war has been long or unsuccessful. After a war, there is a sudden reversal of accepted values for a time, in antithesis to the values supported during the war. (One who wishes to be a hero during the first few years after the present war may very well stick to his pacifism now through all vicissitudes, but he will come to be suspected increasingly as either deluded or a traitor as another war nears.)

As between nations, war has been one

of the preeminent instruments of social selection. The fate of gods as well as empires has been shaped by military victory or defeat. The victor seldom wins political hegemony alone, but also a commanding position in the cultural development of the vanquished. An imperialism is never simply an extension of political and economic power; in its success or failure are bound up all sorts of cultural destinies.

Further, war between nations has been, historically, one of the chief factors in the extension of the size of peace groups. Enlarged political units have risen more often from conquest than from growth of good will, federation, or other peaceful process. There are, of course, notable exceptions. The question of values accompanying the solidification is still another question; enlarged peace groups may wage more destructive wars than small ones, or may represent the triumph of lower values over higher.

IV

There is no certainty, of course, that patterns discernible in the past hold for the present and future. The search for "iron laws" in social relations has been pretty largely abandoned; historical sequences reveal elements of uniqueness, whatever the sources, that defy exact prediction. On the other hand, society certainly is not for the most part plastic, either in the sense that it moves through sheer accident or in the sense that it is determined at any given moment only by free choices of the individuals who comprise it. At least there is culture continuity, and most of the evidence available indicates that the stream of culture retains most of its basic currents, one of which is war, though positions in the channel vary unceasingly. Whether we like it or not, war in some form is

to survive at least as long as the patterns of Western culture survive. The dream of peace must now be envisaged in a dimension different from that in which it was envisaged by the nineteenth century. It can no longer be seen clearly in undistorted historical perspectives. Indeed, to view peace as a mere historical possibility may help to prevent its relative realization. To cry, "peace, peace, when there is no peace," adds to the hurt of peoples, as certainly as to rush headlong into battle without calculating, in terms of every bit of knowledge available, however fragmentary, the probable results. Perhaps the world could do just now with more martyrs and heroes, in favor of the men in ivory towers.

There is no guarantee, of course, that knowledge, even if adequate for the conduct of war, could be translated into social structure and process. The eighteenth century also doubtless had its unwarranted hopes. A leading American newspaper suggested a couple of years ago, in an editorial in serious vein, that a committee of acknowledged anthropological experts should draw up a statement sum-

marizing scientific knowledge concerning race differences, and present the conclusions to Germany. Naïveté in the suggestion is appalling. One wonders how the statement could reach the German people? Even if some way could be found, one wonders if the editors of the newspaper knew that an overwhelming percentage of the world's anthropologists are Jews, and that Nazi technique could use their race to bring their conclusions into still greater disrepute? One wonders, finally, if the Nazi persecutors do not understand what Pareto meant when he said that the false is often more *useful* than the true?

Objective analysis never leads, however, to conclusions that are neutral for action, if conclusions are reached at all. Rather, it brings convictions more enduring and better implemented than any sheer partisanship can produce. Analysis does not necessarily lead to paralysis, even if it does not surely lead to victory. Nor does knowledge of complexities and relativities lead to futility. An ivory tower may be transformed into a battle turret, and be the more effective in a fight if it was built solidly and true from the outset.

THE INTERNAL DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY

By Rose Terlin

When the heavy tread of Nazi boots sounded on the brick pavements of certain European capitals, the obsequies on genuine political democracy had long since been said by those responsible for public policy. This was to a large degree true even in France. Many a Nazi victory has been only the final "accommodation" of the ruling class to totalitarianism. Even the valiant Greek struggle is being fought, not for democracy, but for the right to be ruled by a *Greek* fascism. Industrial capitalism is essentially conflict. The veiled civil war within the nation which we call "peace," so aggravated in the world economic expression, has eventuated in international civil war in which the state of belligerency is unmistakable. The fact that in many nations the struggle within capitalism had reached the point where the effort to save democracy had been lost before the civil war reached the international stage, places us in a very critical position in the United States. If democratic institutions are to be saved it is not enough for us to give battleships and planes—or even men—to Great Britain. This war has two fronts. As the history of European nations has proved, not the least crucial front is the home front.

Fascism is a nihilistic philosophy. Since every social situation has its own dynamics, it behooves us to examine the roots of this nihilism. When the constant effort of the people to strengthen and extend democracy, to realize a better standard of living within the framework of democratic institutions, to eliminate

abuses, to secure a larger measure of social stability is constantly frustrated by the self-interest of powerful and privileged groups, cynicism and paralysis results. This cynicism, in turn, develops nihilism as new myths are found to replace the energies gained from the democratic myth. The manipulations of the ruling class, the cynicism and equivocation of the (formerly) enlightened and progressive forces and the desperation of the masses thus make Fascism inevitable. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that we look realistically and critically at the home front. The nature of this war is such that if we put democracy and social gains in cold storage "for the duration" we lose the war, even if we win it on the international front. As Christians and as Socialists, whether we are pacifist or partisan, we have an important task to be intelligent, vocal and active on the home front of this desperate struggle to maintain and strengthen democracy.

The national defense program is now sufficiently under way that we may estimate some of the economic and social implications that are beginning to emerge, estimating these in terms of human welfare:

Employment—In spite of optimistic speeches from official quarters in Washington concerning the employment of five to six million new workers within a year, the gains in employment from defense expenditures will probably be slow and spotty. This is due to two factors: bottleneck and the higher productivity

of workers. The machine-tool industry, basic to the large plant expansion required, was one of the hardest hit by the depression. Nearly 90 per cent of the skilled workers live in Detroit, where they had very intermittent employment. New workers were not trained during depression years, in the long apprenticeship required. These men must be moved; men skilled in related fields must be reinstated; models for new machinery standardized. This will all take time.

The most important long-run factor, however, will be the enlarging spread between industrial production and the percentage of workers employed. The key industries involved in national defense are those in which a high degree of rationalization has occurred. In October, 1940, the Federal Reserve Board index of industrial production reached 127, a peak higher than 1929. But the employment index stood at 84. There were still between 8 and 9 million unemployed. These figures are more striking when compared with previous indexes. Prior to 1929, production levels lagged behind the employment levels. Since the pit of the depression in 1933, the ratio of employment to production has reversed itself. (U. S. Department of Labor Statistics *Labor Information Bulletin*, September, 1940; *The Economic Outlook*, November, 1940.) Further aggravating the employment problem is the factor of a half-million new workers entering into competition for available jobs every year. If the training programs for workers for defense industry, being provided by the vocational schools, the N.Y.A. and the U. S. Employment Service are limited to "quickie" courses, we shall be left after the defense boom with millions of workers without basic mechanical training. Their ability to be retained in occupations for civilian industry will be negli-

gible. In view of the fact that there are at least 800,000 highly skilled workers still unemployed, it is still harder to justify these "quickie" courses as against courses providing basic skills. It is clear that defense spending will not "solve" the unemployment problem, even temporarily. The dilemmas and contradictions remain.

The question of relief appropriations in the next session of Congress is especially significant in the light of this data. On November 27, the *New York Times* reported that the President has "promised" to cut "all public works expenditures, except those directly connected with munitions production, to the bone. Non-military expenditures are being eliminated so far as possible from the next budget." This announcement so "reassuring" to big business, is devastating to millions of relief clients who have no assurance of being quickly assimilated into industry.

Hours and Wages—Evidence points to a consistent drive on the part of big employers to sabotage the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Walsh-Healey Act, and to lengthen hours. Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., chairman of General Motors, told a dinner of the Academy of Political Science at the Hotel Astor, November 13, that "output (for defense) can be increased 20 per cent by working six days a week in place of five days," and that "the greatest source of inflationary danger at the moment is in the increase in the wage rates and its impact on costs." In his prepared manuscript Mr. Sloan urged that "the penalty for overtime should be canceled during the emergency to encourage a longer work week."

The National Industrial Conference Board has published a report on "Labor Policy and Defense Production." The report tries to show that the lengthening

of the work week is essential to industrial efficiency. The N.I.C.B. itself advocates a 50-55-hour work week. Some employer groups have demanded a 12-14 hour day! The press has consistently implied that the 40-hour week is a hindrance to the national defense effort, often failing to mention that all workers may be employed more than 40 hours a week if time and a half is paid for overtime.

Colonel William Chevalier, in a recent speech, pointed to British experience in this regard: "Beginning with the premise that national defense calls for maximum production, it must be remembered that it has long been recognized that increased hours do not usually result in increased output. England in the fell clutch of circumstances has shortened her working hours, though after the invasion of Norway it had lengthened them to fifty-five and sixty hours a week. Mr. Bevin, British Minister of Labor, said on July 17: 'All the evidence goes to show that we have carried on with these hours too long, and production is on the decline rather than increasing'; and the *Manchester Guardian* said in comment: 'There comes a time when the spirit of patriotic resolve can drive the tired body no further. That time is here. This does not mean that armament production must fall still lower. Reduced hours, on the last war experience, should soon send it up again, besides preserving stores of energy and enthusiasm for future urgencies.' Even in totalitarian Gestapo-policed Germany the sixty-hour week had to be modified because production fell and industrial accidents and stoppages increased."

Similarly efforts are being made to "keep labor costs down." The question of wages cannot be separated from the question of the productivity of the worker, though demands for wage in-

creases by workers are being interpreted as "Communist," "the arrogance of labor" and "chiseling on Uncle Sam." The Bureau of Labor Statistics¹ summarizes the results of its study as follows: "During the past four years substantial increases in wage rates occurred in most industries. *However, on the whole, labor costs were no higher in 1939 than in 1935.* Hence it appears that increases in hourly wage rates were matched by increases in output per man hour." In seven leading industries, unit labor costs were actually lower in 1939 than in 1935. In fact, since 1929 payroll levels have lagged behind employment.

The figures on profits for the first nine months of 1940 also need to be taken into account in relation to wage levels, from the point of view of distribution of the national income. In spite of the fact that large reserves for taxes (larger than necessary) were taken out before net profit was declared, the figures show an enormous increase in net profits compared with the same period in 1939. Jones-Laughlin show a 2,130 per cent increase, United States Steel 221 per cent, etc.² The factors of the productivity of the worker and the amount of net profits must be taken into account in deciding whether wage levels are to be increased. Talk of "the necessity to make sacrifices" is humbug without such considerations.

Labor Organization—The right of labor to organize and to bargain collectively will be a crucial issue in the next few months. The House Judiciary Committee is busily engaged in finding means to hamstring the activity of unions. Representative Howard Smith (Virginia) has introduced legislation to make it a crime, punishable by *life imprisonment*, to "sabotage" the defense industries.

¹ *Monthly Labor Review*, July, 1940, page 36.

² *The Economic Outlook*, November, 1940.

While fantastic, this is nevertheless a straw which indicates the way the wind is really blowing. Mr. Smith is not one of the crack-pots in Congress. Another bill was introduced to outlaw strikes on defense projects and make picketing an "unfair labor practice." Representative Hoffman (Michigan), who introduced the bill, referred to the C.I.O. plan to organize the Ford plant as a "subversive activity" (*New York Times*, November 29, 1940).

In view of the character of this war as a fight for democracy, within and without the nation, this anti-labor drive is extremely ominous. The most effective way to maintain and increase wage levels is by means of a strong labor movement. The economic disaster which will follow this defense boom will be cushioned only by the degree to which labor is able to force a better distribution of the income realized immediately from the defense program.³ This is a patriotic duty—not sabotage! An economy in which U. S. Steel net profits are up 221 per cent, production is up 38 per cent, and wages and employment lag behind production is not a healthy one, and brooks ill for the future, without the kind of safeguards provided by a vital and free labor movement.

Housing—A far more serious housing situation confronts the United States now than in 1916. At that time there was a vacancy ratio in dwelling places under \$50 per month of 8 per cent. Now it is less than 2 per cent. Yet the housing problems of 1916-1920 are still vivid in many workers' minds. Rents jumped as high as 120 per cent in some places. Today in certain defense centers, workers

are paying 50 per cent of their income for rent. Workers are sleeping in autos, garages and even city jails, according to the U. S. Housing Authority.

There are eleven million families in the United States living in sub-standard houses. The \$800,000,000 appropriation of U. S. Housing Authority was sufficient to house 160,000 families and remove a comparable number of slum dwellings. The House has buried S591, a bill to renew the appropriation of the U.S.H.A. because of the opposition of the realty boards. The Federal Works Administration has been given \$150,000,000 for housing for defense workers. This does not require slum clearance, nor does it require the observance of the excellent building standards of the U.S.H.A. and thus may lead to the erection of potential slums such as were built in the last war. Much work may be done on this by individuals and church groups: housing surveys, cooperation with other groups in getting local City Councils to approve housing projects, giving publicity to rent-profiteering and bringing the pressure of public opinion on Congress to renew the U.S.H.A. appropriation.

Nutrition and Health—When nearly 25 per cent of the draftees were rejected recently because of physical disabilities due to inadequate diet, the relation between nutrition and defense was brought forcibly home to the American public. Dr. M. L. Wilson, Director of the Extension Division of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, reported recently: "An estimated forty-five million people in the United States are not getting proper food. . . . Diet such as they are consuming cannot promote optimum nutrition over long periods of time." The Consumers' Division of the National Defense Council estimates that 40 per cent more food will be consumed by men in the armed

³ Ultimately, there is very little income realized from it, since munitions are neither producers' nor consumers' goods—and thereby hangs a grave problem for a capitalist economic structure.

forces than they would have consumed in civilian life.

The best answer to malnutrition is increased income, without a commensurate increase in the cost of essential consumers' goods. Studies show that when low income families improve their economic status, they at once consume more food, both in quantity and variety.⁴ Other measures to help meet the malnutrition problem are: the extension of the Food Stamp Plan, extension of the free school lunch for poor children and public education on diet.

Civil Liberties—Discussion of this subject, worthy of its importance in defending democracy on the home front, is impossible here. However, certain aspects not sufficiently discussed in liberal circles might be stressed. Negroes comprise 10 per cent of our population. Although defense contracts are awarded on the basis of "no discrimination because of race or creed," Negro workers have been consistently barred from jobs in defense industries. This discrimination applies all along the line—in the refusal to admit Negroes to training for posts in aviation, to the fact that the South received proportionately far less funds for training projects, to the discriminations in the Army, etc. A differential policy which discriminates against 10 per cent of our population, solely on the basis of color, makes a mockery of our task of opposition to Fascism in the name of human rights and liberty.

Another minority which finds discrimination growing is the nationality groups. Many second-generation Italians are asking if they should change their names because so many firms are refusing to employ anyone with an Italian name.

⁴For important discussion of nutrition see International Labor Office Study: *Worker's Nutrition and Social Policy*.

This has now been extended to the point where employers seem loath to employ workers with any kind of foreign name!

It is not a healthy democracy in which hundreds of thousands were deprived of the right to vote for the party they wanted in the recent election. The Communist Party and even the Socialist Party were ruled off the ballot in a number of states. The "Solid South" represented a pitifully small proportion of adult citizens, not only because of poll taxes, but also because of the way the "one party system" operates, making for "the unshakable dominance of one or another political clique."⁵

The hysteria against "subversive groups," the persecution of Communists and those charged with Communist affiliations is especially dangerous because of the irresponsible, pseudo-legal means used. It is striking contrast to the way England has dealt with its political minorities, and it can end only by silencing all voices seeking to improve the lot of those on whom injustice has been visited. Fifth-column hysteria may itself become a means of undermining faith in our institutions. We Americans do not easily keep our heads in a crisis. We shoot and do our thinking afterwards. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that we are a very young nation. But this attitude does not provide for the kind of stability and coolness of judgment which is required by a situation so complex as that in which we now find ourselves. It will not be easy in the months ahead to be a staunch supporter of civil liberties, for the irresponsible label-pasting business is already flourishing, with serious consequences for many.

"The country faces a tremendous task: to produce more and more and consume

⁵"Suffrage in the South—The One Party System," George Stoney. *Survey-Graphic*, March, 1940.

less and less. That is the economic paradox of a defense or a war economy." Thus spoke the editors of *Business Week* (November 9, 1940). That is the economic paradox of a war economy. But there is more than one answer to it. If the answer is depressed living standards, long hours of work, continued unemployment for millions, high profits, inflationary price rises, a skyrocketing public debt and annihilation of civil liberties, we shall emerge from this struggle in exactly the same boat as the people of the Fascist nations. There are two ways to solve the economic paradox of a war economy. We can, as J. Middleton Murry says,⁶ "close the gap between national expenditures and income by universal and equal and voluntary sacrifice of all groups in proportion to their ability to sacrifice," or we can do it by imposed,

⁶*Which Way Are We Going?* J. Middleton Murry. The Adelphi.

unequal sacrifice, which is, itself the road to Fascism. Planned authoritarianism or planned socialism are the only ways out. Miss Harriet Elliott of the National Defense Council said recently: "It is significant that in a democracy we want more than military defense. We want to safeguard our American way of life from enemies within, as well as enemies without. Hunger, malnutrition, ignorance and misinformation, lack of adequate housing, clothing, warmth [and jobs]—these are the enemies within our gates. These are the saboteurs of democracy which sap men's faith and strength and courage. They breed suspicion and hatred. They make men wonder: 'What is there to defend? What have I to lose or gain?'" Let us not destroy democracy—economic and political—under the guise of a national defense program; nothing less than a genuine defense of democracy will save us in this war.

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THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE WAR AGAINST NAZI GERMANY

By Arnold Nash

The present European war is unique in that it is the first war in British history about whose necessity the working classes were more convinced than the ruling classes. The typical British working man has few illusions about the war as one fought for democracy in the absolute sense of the American slogans of the Wilson era. Rather he sees it as one fought to save past gains. Since the days of the Chartists through the work of gifted leaders as diverse as Keir Hardie and Ben Tillett and the growing strength of Union organisation he has seen a steady conquest of the citadels of economic (and consequent political and social) privilege. He now finds himself in agreement with Hitler in one point only; it is that in the event of a Nazi victory all these gains will disappear for a thousand years. He is convinced that this will be the case not merely for himself but for the working classes of the whole of Western and Central Europe. His feeling was accurately expressed by R. H. Tawney in his recent letter to the *New York Times* where he wrote: "What confronts us is something at once younger and older than the cupidities of the profit-maker, the dull egoism of property, the multitudinous injustices of a Capitalism which has had its day. It is a creed which holds that common men have no rights at all. It is a system which treats them, not as men, but as cattle." Herein is the reason why the British Labour Movement can throw in

its lot with the "capitalist" parties and yet claim to be fighting for a cause greater than the British Empire. In this respect the movement is simply being loyal to its deeper instincts for there has always been a universalism in the British Labour movement; a universalism which has been none the less real in spite of, or, may be, because of its refusal to express its internationalism in the self-conscious slogans (so dearly beloved by the orthodox Marxist) of the type "Workers of the World Unite." Instead this universalism has tended to express itself too readily (perhaps that has been its weakness) in terms of practical politics—such as, in its official support of collective security, once the pacifism of George Lansbury and his followers had been formally repudiated by the Annual Conference. The long list of acts of wanton aggression beginning with Japan's attack on China in 1931 and culminating in Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939 was a continual affront to that policy. The willingness of the Labour leaders to enter a cabinet led by Winston Churchill was due to the association which many of them had with him from 1935 onwards both in the House of Commons and outside when he and they persistently urged the Baldwin and Chamberlain cabinets to face the need for resistance to Nazi aggression. The events since September of last year have not provided the British working classes with any evidence to lead them to revise that judgment.

Their attitude was well summed up by Arthur Greenwood in his speech at the Annual Conference at Whitsuntide of this year when he closed the debate on the question of whether the Labour Party should enter the Churchill Cabinet with the words: "We have watched Austria, with our Socialist comrades, destroyed; we have seen the same fate befall Czechoslovakia; we have seen it more recently in other countries, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, and the beast still marches on. . . . Labour had built up a strong policy of resistance to aggression, and when at long last a wavering Government plucked up its courage to resist an act of aggression in Poland, the Labour Party in the House of Commons, this National Executive and the General Council of Trade Union Congress had no alternative but to accept the implications of their own policy." This attitude was emphatically endorsed when it was put to the ballot by 2,413,000 votes to 170,000 votes. There was a symbolic scene that afternoon when a message was read from the exiled Polish Socialist Party. "In the name of Polish working people, who first confronted German aggression and are now suffering most horrible persecution under the yoke of the Nazi and Bolshevik invaders, we send to the Congress our most cordial wishes for successful debates in order to establish a better common future, free of the horrors of the dictatorship." Therein was expressed the hopes of the social democratic parties of Western and Central Europe. They see no hope unless there is victory for the land on whose shores many of their leaders found hospitality and a base from which like the International Federation of Trade Unions they can continue the struggle. It is not in Europe alone that there are

causes for freedom whose future is bound up with a Nazi defeat. T. A. Raman, the London correspondent of the Congress paper, *The Hindustan Times*, and himself a member of the Indian Congress Party, said in a recent speech, "The blunt truth of the whole matter is that to us Indians—and I say it without any bitterness—the British Government can never be very convincing champions of liberty; but it so happens today that if the allies are finally defeated, the very prospect of freedom in India would also perish." An interesting comment on the virility of the British democracy is that Raman was asked by the British Broadcasting Corporation to give an exposition of this point of view in a radio address.¹

It is only in the above context that the changes in leadership can be properly understood. The Churchill government is indeed a national government for, as Clement Attlee, the leader of the Parliamentary Labour party pointed out to the Annual Conference meeting as it did during those anxious days in the middle of May, what was necessary was a government which could rally to its support the energies of the whole nation. The Labour leaders were right in insisting that such a government could not be led by the "Men of Munich." That they should even be included in such a Government was a bitter pill for the Labour Movement to swallow but it was inevitable. Chamberlain after all was the leader of the largest party in the House of Commons. There was a strong feeling in Britain that to insist on his removal altogether was "to kick a man when he is down." Perhaps that quixotic

¹Copies of this speech can be obtained gratis from British Library of Information, 50 Rockefeller Plaza, N. Y. C.

trait in the British make-up may lose the war, but on the other hand, if Britain wins, it is even more likely to solve the peace. It was Winston Churchill who was the only allied statesman of the parties in power in America, Britain or France to advocate the sending of ship-loads of food to Germany after her defeat in the Great War.

Churchill's choice from the ranks of Labour Party leaders could not have been bettered. Indeed they were obvious to all close observers of British politics over the last five years. What sort of men are they?

Clement Attlee, now deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the House of Commons, succeeded George Lansbury as leader of the Labour Party in the House of Commons when it formally repudiated pacifism as a practical political policy. Attlee comes of a military family, was educated at Haileybury School and University college, Oxford, and after passing his law examinations took up residence at Toynbee Hall in the East End of London. His stay there was interrupted by the Great War when he became a Major, serving in France and Gallipoli where he won the D.S.O. Since 1922 he has represented Limehouse in the House of Commons. By temperament he is quiet and reserved and though he lacks Churchill's brilliance he has an intellectual caution which wedded to a first-class critical mind makes him an excellent deputy Prime Minister since he has exactly the qualities which Churchill lacks.

Arthur Greenwood, whose performance in the House of Commons in the early days of September immediately prior to the declaration of war will go down to history, is a typical Yorkshireman. He was largely self-educated until he won a scholarship at the turn of the

present century to Manchester University. He subsequently taught economics at Huddersfield Technical College but after a few years joined the civil service only to leave in 1920 to organise the research department of the Labour Party. He did an excellent piece of work as Minister of Health during the MacDonald Government of 1929-1931. He and Attlee are the two Labour members of the "Inner" War Cabinet. Greenwood's special task is to co-ordinate industrial production for civil export and military needs.

Hugh Dalton, the Minister for Economic Warfare, like Attlee is a member of that section of the British privileged classes which has completely thrown in its lot with the Labour Movement. His father, Canon Dalton, was tutor to the Royal Prince who became King George V. Hugh Dalton was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he specialised in government and economics. After serving in the Great War he taught public finance for many years at the London School of Economics. Subsequently he was elected to the House of Commons where he made his name as second in command to Arthur Henderson at the Foreign Office from 1929-1931. Today he would be first choice as Foreign Secretary in any Labour Government. If, as many people expect, Lord Halifax resigns as Foreign Secretary, Dalton would be an excellent man for the job were it not that in his present post he holds a position which demands exactly that combination of profound insight into foreign affairs and detailed knowledge of economics, which he alone of the members of the British Cabinet possesses.

Herbert Morrison's first post in the Churchill Cabinet was that of Minister of Supply, where he was responsible for

the production of all armaments except ships and aeroplanes. He is a typical son of the people, his father being a London policeman and his mother a domestic servant. Leaving school at thirteen he started work as an errand boy, entering politics as organising secretary for the London Labour Party. Possessing administrative gifts which are hardly excelled by any living man, he built up the Labour Party in the capital city of the British empire until it achieved control in 1934 and kept it at the subsequent election in 1937. His concern with the local government of London since 1934 has tended to prevent his taking an active part in national politics although he has had a seat on the Opposition front bench since he was returned to the House of Commons in 1935.

It is undoubtedly his skill in local government and London's confidence in his personality and drive which led Churchill to appoint 'Erb Morrison, as the London Cockney affectionately calls him, as Minister for Home Defence. There he will indeed have Augean stables to clean out for his predecessor, Sir John Anderson, left the problem of air-raid shelters in complete confusion and, although the position of anti-Nazi refugees has by now considerably improved, much remains to be done if Britain is to use her courage and tenacity in the fight against Hitler. In Ellen Wilkinson, one of the leaders of the left wing of the Labour Party, Morrison will have an able lieutenant in her new post as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Home Security.

A. V. Alexander, Winston Churchill's successor as First Lord of the Admiralty, is the only man in the present Labour Party leadership who belongs to the type of working class non-conformist lay preacher through whose devotion the

British Labour Movement was built up and saved from being wedded to an arid and doctrinaire Marxism. He left school in his early teens and started work as a clerk. He became (as he still is today) a Baptist lay preacher, and on Sundays preached in the village chapels of the South-West of England, working the rest of the week for the cooperative (or "consumers") movement as secretary of its parliamentary committee. His appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty by Ramsay MacDonald in 1929 was a tribute by the Labour Party to the movement Alexander represented. But to everybody's surprise this Baptist preacher and expert on the sale and distribution of foodstuffs was instrumental in introducing many valuable reforms in the Royal Navy. Since 1931 until the formation of the Churchill Cabinet he has always been the official spokesman on naval affairs for the Labour Party in the House of Commons. It is not inappropriate that one of Britain's leading experts on food supplies should now be in supreme command of the means whereby the channels for these supplies are safeguarded.

Experience has shown however that Churchill's most interesting appointment is Ernest Bevin to the Ministry of Labour. For some years Bevin has been the most influential single figure in the British Labour Union world and perhaps in the Labour Movement as a whole. Politically he has served behind the scenes and he has never been elected to Parliament. Like Morrison and Alexander he comes of distinctly proletarian stock, starting work as a farm labourer in Somersetshire. He left the farm to deliver milk in Bristol and there became interested in Trade Union affairs. He rapidly rose until in 1922 he became head of the Transport and General

Workers Union which he cleverly built up until it became the largest union in the world. He and Churchill are politically old enemies, for Bevin led successfully the opposition against the war of intervention on Soviet Russia sponsored by the present Prime Minister. But he and Churchill have a tremendous respect and indeed admiration for each other. Their roles, from Hitler's standpoint, have been strikingly similar since each led the movement for rearmament within the political party to which he belongs. In office Bevin has appealed to the popular imagination more than any other member of the Cabinet with the exception of Churchill and he is freely mentioned,—curiously enough most often in middle class circles—as Churchill's successor. He is the type of man who provokes one's imagination. In my own case it takes the form of wondering what would have happened if Bevin and not Chamberlain had negotiated with Hitler. I believe that Churchill could have outmaneuvered the Fuehrer, that Morrison—the other Socialist most often mentioned as Churchill's successor—could have outwitted him, but Bevin is the one man living who could have most completely overawed him. In stature he is possessed of a remarkable physique. In negotiation he is skilful yet compelling. But the weapon which again and again he has most often used with success is the overwhelming and often brutal candour of the man who knows his own strength, has measured his opponents and yet knows that he will win. Such were the tactics when he, more than any other speaker, so swayed the Labour Party conference six years ago when it emphatically eschewed pacifism and George Lansbury resigned as the parliamentary leader. His present task is to ensure

that all available labour is kept busy and that, as the war industry expands to cope with the enormous demands which will be made upon it, men and women will be trained to supplement the activities of skilled workers. Bevin's work has been dominated by a clear understanding of the forces behind Nazi efficiency and ruthlessness. In a May Day speech he rightly accused the Chamberlain Government of a complete unawareness of "The new psychology and organising ability of the people in charge of the totalitarian states." As Minister of Labour and National Service he has, subject to parliamentary control, the final voice in the disposal of the man power of Great Britain from the directors of the Bank of England downwards. His main instrument is a joint consultative committee consisting of seven members of the General Council of Trade Union Congress and seven members of the British Employes Confederation. It was because Morrison and Bevin occupied such key posts in the sphere of production that a shrewd observer like R. H. Tawney could point out that the organisation of the war effort on the economic front lies in the hands of Labour. That is why the Trade Unions have freely consented to waive all manner of their past rights and agreed to work in many cases twelve hours a day for seven days a week. Similarly the coal miners in one coal field agreed to surrender 25% of their free coal allowance in response to the appeal from the new Minister of Mines, D. R. Grenfell—himself a former coal miner—for an increased production. Naturally the inevitable result of this process is that a growing volume of British industry is coming under State ownership. Recently Morrison paid tribute to the cooperation in such plants between the Ministry of

Supply as owners and directors, the managers and technicians who administer them and the manual workers who labour in them. He added truly that in this trend he saw a model of industrial organisation which might well be widely followed. And this unrestrained support of the war effort has not come only from the right wing of the Labour Movement. Ellen Wilkinson is a junior minister, G. D. H. Cole is in charge of the research section of the Ministry of Labour, Stafford Cripps has gone as Ambassador to Moscow and Harold Laski works both in front of and behind the scenes with untiring energy. His major contribution at the moment lies in combatting the Communist thesis that this is just another imperialist war.

The remnant of the Communist Party have tended to bleat as of yore. The Party for years has tended to make up in noise and shouting what it lacked in numbers and influence. But the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Finnish War and the Soviet attitude towards the Baltic countries have been too much for the handful of intellectuals who gave it some modicum of respectability. Many who, like John Strachey, were in the Party have left it. Others outside it like Raymond Postgate and Victor Gollancz who often lined up with the Party against orthodox Labour leaders now attack it. It is true that J. B. S. Haldane, the eminent biochemist, still remains in the Party; whether he will follow his fellow intellectuals is not clear. That he stays in it and reinforces his position by arguing quite seriously but apparently quite truly that the Stalinist brand of Marxism cured him of dyspepsia, shows that like Job, his faith is so profound that he can say "Even though he slay me yet will I trust him." The vast majority of the rank and file of the workers are as ever

unaware of the oscillations of the Party to the tune of Soviet foreign policy. They know that this is a people's war since the Labour Party cannot win the peace unless the Nazis lose the war. They know that leading men in the Government are men of the same social origin as themselves and are known to thousands of workers with that measure of familiarity which the use of a given name to them and about them indicates, and that the deputy leader of the House of Lords himself, Lord Snell, began life as a farm labourer. They know too, that the social services are receiving more attention than in any other previous war and indeed even in more peaceful days; that old age pensions have been increased, that conditions in the building trade have been improved, and that excess war profits are really being prevented. They have few illusions about the shortcomings of British democracy but they have no intention of denying that, unworthy as a champion of democracy Britain may be, her defeat will mean a second Dark Ages for Europe. Not that the British worker would dream of denying the measure of democracy that Britain already has. His comrades who have returned from Dunkirk know that in addition to the Bren guns, tanks and rifles left in Flanders were copies of the Bibles of the German Nazi, the Russian Communist, and the American Pacifist, to wit Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, Karl Marx' *das Kapital* and Richard Gregg's *The Power of Non-Violence* respectively. And he reflects that all these were supplied by the solicitous War Office of the Chamberlain Government! His serving comrades in their turn reflect that more anti-tank guns and fighting planes would have been more to the point. That is why whether he fights the Nazis by operating a lathe in a

machine shop or an anti-aircraft gun on the cliffs of Dover he welcomed the change of government for it represented the appeal by the ruling classes—whose

leaders had failed and failed ignominiously—to the leaders of the working class movement to help save Great Britain in a grave and tragic emergency.

FELLOWSHIP NOTES

The Fellowship decided at its fall meeting to raise a special fund for the rescue of anti-Nazis in Europe. We are glad to report that the treasurer has received \$200 for this purpose from our members. This amount has been sent to the Emergency Rescue Committee which has, under the chairmanship of Dr. Frank Kingdon, contrived the rescue of many heroic anti-fascists from Marseilles and Lisbon. There are still many hundreds waiting in these ports for help and the work is continuing.

The midwinter meeting of the Fellowship will be held at Union Theological Seminary on January 31st. The meeting will begin as usual at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. There will be two lectures and a worship service. The two speakers are Professor Richard Niebuhr of

Yale University and Mr. Lewis Mumford, author of *Faith for Living*. We expect a big meeting.

The finances of *Christianity and Society* are in an unhealthy condition. We need your aid in extending the subscription list of the magazine. Unfortunately the losses in renewals of a quarterly magazine are rather large. At least we make ourselves believe that the forgetfulness of subscribers is the cause of a heavy loss of renewals. It may be that we are fooling ourselves and that our readers don't like us. At any rate we must raise \$200 more this year than we did last if we are to continue to function. We don't want any gifts, but we would like some subscription orders of \$5 from some of our friends which would place our quarterly in five new homes.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE GREAT HATRED, by Maurice Samuel. Knopf, 1940. 209 pp. \$2.00.

The Great Hatred is anti-Semitism but, according to the author, anti-Semitism is to be distinguished categorically from anti-Jewishness, and in a way which makes this book not an analysis of a particular problem among many, but of the crucial problem of contemporary western civilization. Anti-Jewish sentiment, of a piece with other "ordinary" prejudices, is, like them, due to dislike of the dissimilar, misunderstanding, jealousy, demagogic manipulation, the need for a scape-goat for frustrations the actual causes of which cannot be attacked directly, etc. Anti-Semitic hallucination, by contrast, is a diabolic madness. This distinction the author justifies by an astonishing array of facts and cogent reasonings which cannot be even outlined here. In brief, anti-Jewishness is revealed by "kike," "sheeney," "ol' clo' man," etc.; anti-Semitism by "World corrupter," "international plotter," "enemy of civilization."

The peculiar, grossly pathological nature of the great hatred is explained as "the expression of the concealed hatred of Christ and Christianity, rising to a new and catastrophic level in the western world." Why should there be a hatred of Christ, why should it achieve its apogee at the present time and why must it be disguised? The pith of the Judeo-Christian religious ethic is its God-guaranteed worthfulness of the individual person. This is the leaven that has worked for two centuries in the west and which is essentially responsible for progress toward personal worth, freedom and responsibility, and the political ex-

pression of which is democracy. The fear of freedom, or rather, of the responsibilities it entails, is always very great and with the complexity of modern life becomes intolerable for masses of people. As a result they are eager to slough off the autonomous self with its pains and burdens and narcotize themselves into the security of an authoritarian dogma. Nazi-Fascism is the conscious, organized expression and rallying center of anti-Christian depersonalization. But the Christian personalization of western man has entrenched itself too widely for a direct attack upon it to be politically strategic and too deeply in everyone for those who resist it to let themselves be fully aware of it as the enemy. Hence the displacement of the reactive hatred upon the Jews who are appropriate for this function for a combination of reasons: on the one hand, all the reasons which make for anti-Jewish prejudice and, on the other hand, they are the Christ gives both in the sense that they produced Christ and in the sense that their prophetic ethos is "Christian" yet in a less obvious and less powerful (less widely held) form than Christianity. (The foregoing explains why the Nazis at first attempted to Teutonize Jesus and later, as they grew stronger, attacked Christianity directly.) This argument is psychologically plausible—it accords with what is known of the intricate but strictly determined formation of neurotic symptoms.

Thus anti-Semitism is not incidental to Nazi-Fascism, but its core. Nazi terror of the Jews as threatening world domination is not illusory since the Jew symbolizes the personalization of man which is a world-wide movement and has

entered into the formation of the character structures of even the Nazis themselves. A political expression of modern man's inner division against himself is the uniquely contemporary phenomenon of the fifth column—not in the sense of alien spies, but in the sense of appeasers, secret or unconscious admirers of the Nazi-Fascists. The strength of the latter in face of the democracies is due to their greater integrity: they consciously espouse the way of depersonalization; the modern liberal democratic man professes the way of personalization but is inwardly in conflict because unconsciously afraid of freedom—power-loving—anti-Christian—anti-Semitic.

Quite logically the nature of the therapy follows from the nature of the diagnosis. Anti-Semitism, since it is not mere anti-Jewishness, cannot be conquered by attempts on the part of Jews to reduce real and apparent causes for it, nor by their struggle for Jewish rights. Neither can it be conquered by the refutation by liberal or scientific Jews or non-Jews of the Nazi absurdities about the numbers and power of the Jews, or their fantastic racial theories. Opposition of these kinds is defeated at the beginning for it misses the real meaning of anti-Semitism. The only effective opposition consists in eliminating the least flicker of "anti-Semitism" (Christ-hatred, power-worship, fear of freedom) from our hearts and establishing true democracy in our social systems.

The brief indication given of the argument does not begin to do justice to this original, provocative, informative, and penetrating study. The author deals with most of the phenomena pertinent to his thesis, always in a brilliant and plausible way and often convincingly. His way of seeing and understanding has that depth of psychological insight

which is so generally lacking in treatments of social phenomena with their too rational, common-sense approach which disregards the dark, demonic depths of human motivation.

However, the present reviewer is unconvinced by the thesis at two important points. In the first place, the distinction between "anti-Semitism" and other "ordinary" prejudices (including "anti-Jewishness") is not as great as the author claims. The disproportionate antipathy to the Jews can be in part explained by certain factors which distinguish them from other minority groups: many of them are preëminent among minority groups in their maintenance of group self-consciousness and in their identifiability as "different," racially or religiously; while not as powerful in the absolute sense as the Nazis claim, what other minority group has a comparable achievement in art, science and finance? Regarding the "ordinary" prejudices, these are not as free from gross pathology and demoniacal quality, from displacement of unavowable hatreds, as the author's thesis seems to require.

Secondly, the author's identification of democracy, and the idea of the worth of the individual which inspires it, with the Christian movement is untenable. True, he speaks of Christianity's deflections, corruptions, etc., but is this enough? It is the prophetic strain in Christianity which the author counts upon to make his point and while this strain has shown great persistence and has occasionally become influential has not this been the exception rather than the rule? This is an important reason for the atheism of original Marxism which certainly was on the side of emancipation and humanization and against enslavement and depersonalization.

The author explains the inapplicability of his thesis to Communism, which is not anti-Semitic, by the fact that Communists attack Christianity directly and hence need not displace their anti-Christianity upon the Jews. Aside from the falsification involved in equating contemporary Communism with Nazi-Fascism, it completely fails to account for the attitude of original Marxism which, however imperfectly, was realistically concerned with the conditions of human freedom while the churches were predominantly a bulwark of reaction. Furthermore, perennial sources of democracy and freedom are inherent in human nature and in social living. The individual and social phenomena from which the insights of the Hebrew prophets and of Jesus emerged are continually active. If the author should say "yea" to this, as he probably would, but add that the Christian tradition favored and supported such insights, our reply would be that as it has actually functioned historically it has favored reaction more often than progressivism. The antipathy of the Nazis to the churches is due largely to the fact that they are competitors in the claim of an ultimate authority rather than that they are factually effective supporters of the anti-Nazi dictum of human freedom.

The Great Hatred is enlightening regarding many important but obscure factors in the contemporary human situation but its thesis is an over-simplification achieved at the expense of serious falsifications.

HARRY BONE.

CHRISTIANITY AND POWER
POLITICS, by Reinhold Niebuhr.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. Pp.
xiii-226. \$2.00.

Dr. Niebuhr remains the most acute

and enlightening writer on the Christian's duty in our time. In this collection of essays, several of them published before, he again astonishes us with his insights into the ideologies and problems of our day, especially with regard to the burning issue of Christianity and war. He pays tribute to the pacifist's desire to make his life a "symbol of the Kingdom of God" which is irreconcilable with war. But he insists that Christianity is more than "the law of love"; it is also the recognition that we do not live by that law. He argues effectively that a Christian is bound up in a sinful common life which imposes upon him the duty of social and political action. Such action cannot be altogether free from coercion, and may even issue in violence and war. A Christian must struggle for justice, and against oppression and tyranny. When he shirks this responsibility, he may gratify his conscience, but he also may strengthen the arm of the tyrant and contribute to the spiritual slaughter of his fellow man. Dr. Niebuhr points out that those who will not take sides in the present struggle on the basis that there is no significant choice between them are really cynics and pessimists who fail to make proper distinctions between levels of coercion and injustice, and give up the political struggle as futile. This is a clever and just answer to the idealists who have been accusing Dr. Niebuhr of both cynicism and pessimism. In any case, the pacifist may well be the ally of the oppressor. Hence it is hard to see how one can live by "the law of love" with an easy conscience.

And yet, it is only a little less difficult for a Christian to endorse mass slaughter without fear and trembling. I think Dr. Niebuhr is right; we should support fully the present struggle against tyranny.

But I also think that we should be prepared for a victory of our enemies. Nazism may well be a judgment of God upon the "western democracies." God may well intend that we should suffer much more than we dare to imagine. In His secret counsel, He may have in store for us a good far beyond our "realistic" hopes. Hence we should do our duty as our common life presents it to us, avoiding both idealism and cynicism. But I believe a Christian may never forget that "man proposes, God disposes." Dr. Niebuhr will agree with all this. But I wish there were in his book more of trust in Divine providence and the dialectic of agony and joy which comes from the faith that God cannot be defeated.

One despairs of conveying to the reader a proper sense of the richness of this book, of its intellectual excellence, of the force of its arguments against the utopians and the like, of the prophetic power of its message for our time. There is not a chapter in it which will not enlighten the reader; those entitled "Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist," "Idealists as Cynics," "Synthetic Barbarism," "Modern Utopians," "An End to Illusions," and "The Christian Church in a Secular Age," are especially interesting and full of insight. No one should be a pacifist without having wrestled with this book.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN.

THE TWO HUMANITIES, *by D. R. Davies*. Harper. \$2.50.

D. R. Davies, a minister in Wales, has given a bold definition of the wrath of God and the love of God, particularly in the consequences of God's wrath for modern man and the possibilities of His love for both personal and collective

man. Man's contradiction of his origin, the transformation of the will to obedience to an independent will, causes man to know God only as "resistance and destruction." The creativity of modern man, the child of the Renaissance, has been dissipated and the present war reveals the spiritual pretenses which has made him a prisoner of his own self-consciousness. The war, unnecessary from the point of view of reason and unintelligible from the point of view of man's self-estimation, underlines the basic spirit of modern man—the will to destruction. This will sets man against himself and makes him incapable of healing the wounds which are sapping his life's blood. Modern man can neither stem the forces of suicide nor can he solve the problems of his collective life. Being for the first time in a position of mastery over nature he finds himself impotent to handle the problems of world markets, profits and distribution, and the monopolistic control of common political procedure. Man is set against himself. "Humanity which took the reins of destiny out of God's hands thus staggers along towards the abyss of non-being. . . ."

The author rightly centers the anguish of man in the problem of freedom. But his delineation of freedom will be too rigorous and all but incomprehensible for those who have substituted rational freedom for Christian liberty. The rationalist will be puzzled by this interpretation of freedom for it proceeds, in true prophetic fashion, from the premises of frustration rather than fulfillment. It is consequent that Davies turns not to Idealism but to Dostoevsky whose conception of freedom is born out of man's irrationality rather than his reason. For, the unfettered reason, the God of modern man, is the effort of re-

bellious man to harness the forces of destruction by denying them. Freedom, in natural man, arises in a form which can only be negative—a will to destruction. “. . . Why, what man most needs is an independent will—no matter what the cost of such independence of volition, nor what it may lead to . . . there is one occasion . . . when man can willfully, consciously desiderate for himself what is foolish and harmful. This is the occasion when he yearns *to have the right* to desiderate for himself what is foolish and harmful, and to be bound by no obligation whatsoever to desiderate anything that is sensible. . . .”

Primitive man had no personal consciousness: he was embedded in the fabric of society. Civilized man became personal. The man of the Graeco-Roman world had a personal consciousness combined with a sense of his spiritual interrelation in society. But modern man, under the Promethean urge of the Renaissance, became personal man with a vengeance. As an individual he lost his rapport with his world and became an atom in a world of atoms. The sense of personal reality, because of its isolation, became an unchecked will to power. Modern man was rendered incapable of having ethical relations. “Self-conscious individuality is a star moving in its own orbit, isolated in its own being. . . .” Being now alone he is powerless before the mutual anarchisms which threaten him.

But although man is lost, he is not irrevocably lost, for the potentiality of freedom is his, his by virtue of the Incarnation, for in God’s entrance into history, the will to nothingness *may be* converted so that man may yet know reconciliation, atonement and redemption.

The token of this freedom will be man’s recognition of his impoverish-

ment. In man’s despair, a tortured cry of self-abasement, will the will to power be harnessed by humility and forgiveness? In such an awakening man may be cast out of the prison of his own self-consciousness into living relations with his brother.

But the character of freedom is such that in each new divine presentation, man may deny his destiny. “Modern man may refuse to exercise his freedom, for I tell Thee . . . that man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over the gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born.” These words of Dostoevsky, Davies holds, indicate the fearful reality which has already happened and which may happen again to those who do not pursue freedom on a new plane.

The mark of this new freedom for collective man would result in the socialization of our self-consciousness. The mutual anarchisms of life would be transcended; production would have as its end consumption rather than profit; world markets would be placed in the hands of international control; national sovereignty would be subordinated to international authority and a truly democratic federation of states would be created. By means of a radical internal revolution—individual man would escape the lethargy of collective man and would break through the political lassitude of self-imprisonment. The will to power will either be chastened by a new mutuality of freedom in responsibility or modern man will become tribal man.

Readers of *Christianity and Society* will appreciate the attempt of the author to speak theologically of needed social changes as well as spiritual changes. The book will do much to disprove the popular thesis that orthodox thinkers are so-

cially sterile. At the same time, one must indicate that there are points at which one is forced to differ seriously with Davies' premises—mainly with his somewhat ambiguous vacillations between philosophy and theology. One is troubled by the fact that Davies speaks much of the Ungrund as the source of man's insight and not at all of the *Word of God*. "Out of this Ungrund—this abysmal ground of being—arose the doctrine of the majesty and sovereignty of God." The reference to Ungrund rather than the Word is plainly an intrusion of the very immanentism which Davies fights against in the modern temper. Perhaps this dangerous omission will be attributed to an element of Hellenistic thought which is overmuch concerned with the focal point between history and pre-existence rather than the focal point between history and eternity—the Word of God. This way of thinking may also account for a doubtful interpretation of the fall as meaning the fall of the angelic, flamelike spirit into the world of matter.

Perhaps these dangerous omissions will help to convince the reader that theology dare not pursue a course whose essential premises will not be drawn directly in relation to—rather than in ignorance of—the insights of the Reformation. One feels that the book would not only have given a more accurate description of Protestant thought but also would have had more direction and unity had it included more than one or two and wholly negative evaluations of Luther and Calvin.

Yet although many will be forced to differ with Davies' excursions from orthodoxy, his book will be found to be well worth study in that it is the first sober attempt to apply specifically Christian categories of freedom to the torturous world of the headlines, the

world of our doom and slavery. It is in such a study as this that one finds hope that serious Christian thought will continue to dispense with the externals of analysis and penetrate into the heart of the theological problem.

FRED DENBEAUX.

WISDOM AND FOLLY IN RELIGION, by *Joseph Haroutunian*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940. 174 pp. \$2.00.

Can you imagine the doctrine of double election as an instrument of social regeneration? This question measures the earnestness and the straightforwardness with which the author of this volume draws the line between wisdom and folly in religion today. This is a book about the Christian faith and therefore about all the problems of society. It is concerned with conviction rather than with the mechanics of living and therefore it is categorical about the relations between faith and social reconstruction. The Christian faith has its own interpretation and its own obligations with respect to social cohesion and social disintegration. It has some things to say of itself or it has nothing to say at all.

Dr. Haroutunian has just begun his work as Associate Professor of Theology at the Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Chicago. This is his second book and it marks him out as a brilliant member of an unhappily small group of people whose thoroughgoing at-homeness in the modern world is the fruit of and not the substitute for a virile religious faith. He knows to whom he is talking and he knows what he wants to say. The message is that contemporary Protestantism is a house divided against itself with the gloomy prospect of being reduced to

irrelevance and futility because it can no longer converse with the sensitive spirits, whose having lost their illusions about the present is the best guarantee of their constructive contribution to the thought and life of the days to come. These "unbelievers of our day . . . are the 'publicans and sinners' . . . who will enter the Kingdom of God before the comfortable and complacent believers who administer or receive the innocuous religion in our churches." If the churches called Protestant and their religion with which this essay is mainly concerned "manifested a sufficient conviction 'that there is a Protestant mind worthy of consideration,' and if they were sufficiently discerning of the abyss in which they dangle between the 'humanistic aspects . . . of the mind of our age' and the 'caricature of Catholicism and Protestantism,' they might have a word of power and of healing for this magic moment in the world's history. For the unbelievers, 'these people live in the valley of the shadow of sin and death.' And 'the Christian gospel of deliverance from sin and death presupposes the tragic sense of life.' It is the genius and the glory of the Protestant Reformation to have rediscovered and reaffirmed this gospel. So that by nature and by heritage, Protestants are disposed toward all 'expressions of a chastened spirit in our day.' If they will face both the facts of life and the facts of death, they will be able to speak a word to God to these people 'who need Him but cannot find Him; they will proclaim to them a religion which will 'ring true; which will illumine their steps in this valley of the shadow of death.'" Contemporary atheism is the opportunity of a genuinely Protestant religion. And then, by a singular combination of iconoclasm and faith—the telling no-

tice which makes Professor Richard Niebuhr's introduction really the best review of the book—the author proceeds to scourge the household of faith beyond the gates of the Holy See for its magic and its moralism, for its sentimentality and its practicality, and shames it for forgetting, while he recalls it with persuasive power, to justification and atonement, to original sin and total depravity, to election and predestination. Professor Haroutunian has placed all of us who are sincerely concerned with the sickness of society and the healing power of the Christian gospel in his debt by rebuking the stubborn half-truth which discarded the life-blood of Protestant thought as theologically sterile or theologically fictitious—i.e., the work of theologians who had lost their way both in religion and in life—and by demonstrating that the structure of Protestant thought at the beginning actually embodies the analysis and the solution of the deep disquiet of the modern spirit.

When these two—the structure of Protestant thought and the deep disquiet of the modern spirit—stand really over against each other, and if they should really meet, then the doctrine of double election would become an instrument of social regeneration. "The crown of Protestant piety is the doctrine of 'double election.' . . . It is the virtual liberation of the religion from the anthropocentric perspective and the delusion, magic and idolatry it generates. . . . The doctrine of double election, with the implied 'willingness to be damned to the glory of God,' is essential to Protestant piety. They are iron badges of the Protestant's wisdom, reverence for fact, disinterested love of truth, triumph over self-love in the disinterested love of God." Exactly so! And while Protestants have been busy apologizing for

Calvin's over-enthusiastic logic and the quite understandable ? limitations of insight of the Reformers as children of their time, honest men, of stout heart and resilient mind, have both lost respect for the apology and come to terms with the inexorable and the pitiless in the universe. They are unable to go on from there to the truth that sets men free. But there, at least, they stand without the hypocrisies of piety and morals. These men know how self-interest corrupts both reason and impulse in human nature. They know both the complexity and the stubbornness of social conflict, a contest of competing self-interests bent upon the exercise of power. They know that neither nature nor history is hospitable to the expectation of the infra-worldly resolution of the constant tension between man's hopes and dreams and man's frustrations.

Contemporary atheism lives without illusions. It is, therefore, the vanguard of the regenerative remnant in a society that is sick unto death. It is the vanguard because it has moved beyond the interpretation of that sickness in doctrinaire religious, scientific, cultural, and politico-economic categories. But contemporary atheism does not live by faith. It lacks the will to obey God and to serve Him because it does not behold His glory in the heavens and His honor in the rising and the falling of the nations. Those readers who have not yet come to what Nietzsche has profoundly called "the hour of great contempt," who, therefore, still think of the contribution of religion to society in terms of indefatigable and unsullied idealism, or world economic conferences called at the insistence of the churches, or maintaining the democratic way of life, will

recognize in the call to obedience and to the service of God but the ghost of an other-worldly religion. One can only hope that all such will speedily come to unbelief and read this book. For they will then have eyes to see, and in its pages they will discover that obedience to it and the service of God are ethically significant because they belong together as the beginning and the end of the ethical life, and because, when kept together, they give perspective and direction to ethical action otherwise doomed to oversimplification and frustration.

Perhaps Dr. Haroutunian's remnant is too readily discernible among the unbelievers to whom he recommends obedience as "religion's counterpart to the demand of intelligence that proper regard be paid to the facts." Perhaps, too, "the sense of vanity" which has replaced the illusions among the unbelievers is, in part, the fruit of a "sense of proportion" which resists the service of God, not because it lacks "compassion" but precisely because it sees everything in proportion. Perhaps, proportion must also go the way of goodness and piety before one truly obeys and serves God and therefore the disinherited are, perhaps, nearer to the Kingdom of God than the merely disillusioned (Matthew 25). But these reservations, in so far as they may be valid, can only strengthen the demand to be read and to be heeded which this volume makes upon all earnest sharers in the tragic sense of life. They do not alter in the slightest my own cordial agreement with the author that the conviction that God has the first and the final word over the affairs of men and nations, far from delivering up the soul to vanity, commits it the more impatiently, steadfastly, and hopefully to the struggle against sin and all the powers

of darkness toward the regeneration of society.

PAUL LEHMANN.

STATE OF THE MASSES, by Emil Lederer. W. W. Norton and Co. 245 pp. Index. \$2.50.

Many people have found it quite impossible to understand any analysis of fascism other than a purely economic one. So ingrained is the idea of "the economic man" that any other conception of human nature or human motivation seems utterly alien. For this reason many have felt that such a thesis as Rauschnigg's in *The Revolution of Nihilism* is nonsense. Although Rauschnigg made clear what he meant by revolutionary nihilism, he did not give a general frame of reference in which it could be understood. Professor Lederer, the late Dean of the "University in Exile," supplies this frame of reference in his posthumous book, *State of the Masses*. Revolutionary nihilism is to be understood as a political phenomenon which takes place when the structure of society is kept in a constant state of fluidity. This dynamism is the exact opposite of the dynamic character of society we usually associate with creativity. It is destructive because all of society is directed toward the end which the leader and the party dictate. This is accomplished by the breaking down of traditional social groups—which, with their relative autonomy, have in the past supplied both the stability and the tension upon which creative, yet orderly, advance was possible. In a state of the masses the economic motivation is subverted and cannot function so as to bring about a healthy and productive tension, because there are no social groups with any measure of autonomy. True, there have always been masses;

but in the fascist state we have an entirely new political phenomenon. Professor Lederer writes: "In the course of history masses frequently have played a great role. In revolutions, in coups d'état and also in the ordinary current of events, masses have frequently swayed the decisions. But in these cases the masses were called up for certain purposes, and after they had functioned they relapsed again into obscurity; only in revolutionary periods are they more frequently appealed to. But the modern political leaders, prospective dictators, have made them the basis of a movement which aims not only at permanence but at the domination, the swallowing up, of the state; they have institutionalized the masses, making them a political and social steam roller, crushing social groups of every kind. In this epoch masses are the permanent basis of a political system, the nature of which is determined by this fact."

The subject of the whole book is "the destruction of society at large," by "the substitution for society of institutionalized masses." Professor Lederer contends that without articulation into groups society is a veritable shambles at the mercy of every emotive word spoken by the leader, who must in turn keep the masses from forming into groups which have any autonomy, in order that he may stay in power. This vicious circle is indeed a revolution of nihilism: it must live on irrational passion, brutal emotion, war, violence and destruction. It cannot stop without ceasing to be what it is; and hence it tends to be self-perpetuating.

As Professor Lederer is at some pains to point out, here is warning to socialists as well as to those who hope for anything from fascism. The "classless" society is a "mass," or at least in extreme

danger of becoming one. All left-wingers but the most firm believers in the benevolence of Stalin have been aware for some time that the problem of social justice must be considered from the point of view of retaining some personal liberty as a counter-balance against centralized political power. Here the problem is dealt with in a wider area and with greater insight and force.

Professor Lederer does not give up his hope for socialism although he insists that any ideas of social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat must be abandoned—indeed the idea of a “classless society” is a very dangerous one. He insists upon the necessity of evolution rather than revolution but he is not quite clear whether or not he believes that society can be articulated into social groups other than classes. He tends to insist on the necessity of the latter.

This emphasis is no doubt important and should serve as a guide to political action. But certainly the present system of classes, with its great disparity in both ownership and control, need not be retained. A “classless” society need not be without articulation into various groups—farmers, laborers, engineers, clerks, etc.—who with various interests and functions may each have the necessary autonomy and provide the requisite tension to produce a healthy society. This is a problem into which Professor Lederer does not go. Nor does he concern himself with what can be done with the already existing states of the masses. However, he does supply a political frame of reference by which we may better understand our world; and he does lay down a *caveat* that no responsible person interested in a better society may overlook.

RICHARD W. DAY.

FROM MANY LANDS, by Louis Adamic. Harper & Brothers. \$3.50.

Instead of dwelling on the mere economic plane of the greatest migration in history, the peopling and settling of the new world, Adamic, with a stirring intimacy, makes a fascinating beginning in exploring, in creative story form, the cultural past of some of the over fifty racial and ethnic groups of the American people. Taking stock imaginatively of the varied cultural resources of the people, he constructively dreams of harnessing the human yearnings poured out by the tens of millions who came to our shores.

Adamic has made the cultural contributions of the immigrant groups his special field of creative writing, being eminently equipped for it in his own right. A great deal more has been written about our varied ethnic and racial groups that has been derogatory and critical. Especially has this been so in the case of the new immigration, of those people coming to America since the early eighteen-nineties. Only comparatively recently has a new and a nobler tone made itself felt in American learned and creative literature with regard to the spiritual heritage embodied in these divergent ethnic groups.

As a literary album, the vignettes of actual persons, families and distinctive groups are so many illuminating studies of social psychology pregnant with cultural disclosures.

In the presence of the many distinct peoples within the borders of our land, accounting in no small degree for the heightening of self-critical national awareness, lies the hope of the survival of democracy, of the stimulating aspiration of a qualitatively higher form of democracy. The future of an America

qualitatively higher is possible and can be helpfully stimulated by fostering the many common fields of the American cultural past. Our people, living probably the most variedly tensioned patterns of life, have now reached the age of adolescent self-consciousness, upon whose eccentricities a new, more mature level of orientation and integration can be achieved, all under the puissant sway of the eighteenth century philosophical principles of the American dream. These literary pictures are all delightfully informative about interesting peoples, whose varied doings add to the little known fascination of American life, which is not nearly as drab, as uniformly monotonous as one's overhasty travels might seem to disclose, and as one gets the impression from hearsay and press, both metropolitan and rural. What inspiring human qualities have the sturdy souls *From Many Lands* brought to our shores, some the humanly best foundation material for a nation that seeks to remain a rock of democracy in a world of technological barbarism.

Only as the American-born second and third generations of "foreigners" move away from the current surface values of Americanism, recapturing what is best of the cultural heritage of their ancestors, will they truly contribute to what is enduring. Adamic is fully aware of the negative aspects of our plural nationalisms, with their interlacement of economic, social, political, religious and spiritual problems, and causing in the background tensions of all sorts that may never find their release. He is not alone in the thought that America, the paradise of millions of life-tossed people, will assure her real future much more to the descendants of the motley immigrant groups revive in living memory

and active life the spiritually linked traditions of their parents or grand-parents.

It is especially those inwardly acquainted with the whole complexity of second generation problems, who, if they are at all aware of their peculiar position, ought to become the true leaders of good Americanism with its central principle of placing a premium upon the merits of the individual man, and not upon his accidental racial, ethnic, economic and ecclesiastical affiliations. It is these "marginal folk" that may become the chosen ones for making American democracy in its multi-dimensional quality a concrete reality. Even though it is an uphill task, it is yet a potent cause to which the future belongs. Only those who fight for what is potentially ideal in American life, will in the end have themselves and the truly civilized values they personally represent accepted as equals in enriching the intra-American pattern of life.

Adamic is not blind to the fact that Americans who are racially and ethnically "marginal men" may, upon finding themselves in unhealthy situations, become possible threats to national unity. These American-born "foreigners" are haunted by the stark reality of not being wanted even though they are as American as any. It is an odd thing to be an American and yet not to be recognized and treated as such. It is these Americans that ask for a sustaining feeling that they are as much of a part of our national and cultural life as any democratically minded member of the old stock has always believed them to be. The danger to ultimate national unity lies in the prolonged denial of full citizenship rights to the American-born ethnic and racial groups.

America can give the concept of democracy the broadest possible base and

significance because of its unusual opportunity with multi-form contacts of races and peoples. The true essence of the New Deal centers in the aim to do just this in direct contrast to the objectives of the European dictators and American big business. These stories *From Many Lands* embody Adamic's faith in the possibilities of a pan-human American culture and democracy.

HERMAN HAUSHEER.

THE CREED OF CHRIST, by *Gerald Heard*. Harper & Brothers. \$2.00.

For some time now Gerald Heard and Aldous Huxley have been engaged in a religious partnership in Hollywood, to which the one came from a superficial naturalistic religion and the other from a complete cynicism. Both of them have moved far from their former standpoint and Mr. Heard's present religion is as much an improvement over his original position, as is Huxley's mysticism over his original cynicism. Mr. Huxley has presented his mysticism frankly for what it is: a quasi-Buddhistic search for deliverance from selfhood. Mr. Heard, for some strange reason, tries to clothe his almost identical faith in the garments of Christianity. His latest book is entitled "The Creed of Christ" and the subtitle is "An interpretation of the Lord's Prayer."

While there is little of the essential genius of the "creed of Christ" in this interpretation, one must gratefully record that Mr. Heard's diagnosis of the character of human selfishness, his astute understanding of all the subterfuges and disguises which the self employs in seeking to hide its sin from itself and from others, spring from profound spiritual insights. He sees very clearly in what

sense the quintessence of sin lies in the "claim to be myself the Godhead and therefore permitted to use any means I hold to be necessary."

But it soon becomes apparent that his theory of salvation is Buddhistic rather than Christian, and that his theory of sin is mystic. He believes that man is selfish because he is a self and that salvation consists in "naughting" the self until it achieves absorption in the divine. With the mystics he regards "creaturehood" itself as evil, and also of course the very time process in which individuality emerges: "In time we can never quite tell the truth.—Heaven alone is real." He speaks of the "mystery of inborn evil, animal perversity and blindness, racial tragedy and the black problem of time itself." In short he hasn't an inkling of understanding for the fact that the whole Christian interpretation of life has as its foundation the credo that "God saw all that he had made and behold it was very good."

His interpretation of the Lord's prayer therefore becomes a Buddhistic reinterpretation in which little of the original is left. The very earthy prayer "give us this day our daily bread" is made to mean "give us heavenly bread for the day to come," that is, for the day of release from this earth. The petition "forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors" is explained in terms which reveal the whole mystic philosophy which underlies his approach. "Because we have fallen into the error of thinking of ourselves as individuals we are completely arrested and as long as we so think we must stay so," he declares. In a further development of the theme he writes: "Because we are forgiven we can forgive. These are not separate acts but two aspects of one cycle of recovered Reality,

covered Being, of deliverance not from separate sins but from the cause of all sin, the delusory sense of a separate self depending on God and independent of man." Here a hair divides the false from the true. For it is true indeed that sin consists in the "vain imagination" which persuades man that he is independent of God and man. But the cure of this sin is not the destruction of selfhood as the mystics imagine.

"Deliver us from evil" is consistently interpreted to mean not deliverance from sin, but from the time process itself and by virtue of the usual disengagement of what is eternal in man from what is temporal. "Consciousness *ex sui generis*. The human soul is timeless, eternal. If it refuses to follow the destiny of its growth, to climb, then it cannot change but must repeat, trapped in the awful repetition of its willful ignorance, always maintaining that life has no meaning."

While Mr. Heard shows no familiarity with Meister Eckhardt, his doctrine approaches Eckhardt's idea of the elimination of "creaturehood" as the method of salvation and of the destruction of the "will" rather than its obedient subordination to God's will. Naturally he has no counsel for the Christian in any particular historical situation, except the advice not to become involved in the claims and counter-claims of social conflict: "Victory in the present war can only prove one thing; that the strongest and the most cunning side, not the most righteous, has won." Thus, man's existence on this earth, in so far as it is embodied in physical life, is regarded as purely physical and robbed of all meaning and purpose. Unlike the rigorous mystics of the Orient, however, Mr. Heard is not completely pessimistic about temporal existence. His search is

not for Nirvana but for a heaven upon earth through the action and lives of people who have eliminated selfhood. In this conclusion the occidental optimists are certainly less profound than the oriental pessimists. For if life should actually be what both oriental and occidental mystics would have it be, namely a corruption of eternal being through the time process itself, it is more profound to expect no salvation within that time process than to hope for it.

One feels a little sad about the return of men like Heard and Huxley to religion because their new found faith so naively disregards and fails to understand the basic genius of Christianity as a religion which takes history seriously; and is therefore so completely irrelevant to the issues which faith must face in tragic eras such as our own.

R. N.

SPRINGS OF CREATIVE LIVING,
by Rollo May. Abingdon-Cokesbury
Press. \$2.00.

Here is a book by a member of the Fellowship which has a really fresh approach to the relation between psychiatry and psychoanalysis and Christian faith. The book goes far beyond the depths of most pastoral psychologies which seek to appropriate a little psychological knowledge for the use of the preacher. What is significant about the book is that the author has made a thorough study of Jung, Freud, Adler, Kunkel et al, and sees what is significant in their teachings. But he also has a firm grasp of a Christian view of human nature as it is given us in the total Christian tradition, and not merely in the modern sentimental and moralistic versions of Christianity. He knows what

Christianity means by sin and grace and in what sense the psychoanalysts verify these insights and how far their too biological approach obscures the Christian doctrine of man.

R. N.

A PRAYER AGAINST TYRANTS

O God who resisteth the proud and givest grace to the humble, who castest down the mighty from their seats, and destroyest every high thing which exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, deliver the world from the oppression of cruel men.

We pray for the people whose liberties have been despoiled, for Jews, Poles, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, Czechs, and all men who are the victims of the arrogance of power and the cruelty of pride.

We pray Thee for the nations who have the fortune and the courage to resist tyranny. May they not falter or despair.

We pray for ourselves, lest we imagine that our security is proof of our virtue, or accept a quietness, for which other men suffer and die, with an easy conscience.

Teach all of us how to resist evil according to our several callings and within the limits of Thy providence. Remind us that the evil against which we contend is in our hearts also. So may courage and humility support each other in our engagement with evil.

O Lord to whom alone vengeance belongeth, save us from pretending that our condemnations of evil are equal to Thy judgments under which we must stand with the evil-doer. Give us nevertheless firmness in the right as Thou hast given us to see the right.

So may we resist the arrogance of power and not succumb to the pride of virtue within ourselves. Amen.